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Damage	 awards	 for	 pain	 and	 suffering	 and	 punitive	 damages	 are	
notoriously	 unpredictable.	 Courts	 provide	 minimal,	 if	 any,	 guidance	 to	
jurors	determining	these	awards,	and	apply	similarly	minimal	standards	in	
reviewing	 them.	 Lawmakers	 have	 enacted	 crude	 measures,	 such	 as	
damage	caps,	aimed	at	curbing	award	unpredictability,	while	ignoring	less	
drastic	alternatives	that	involve	guiding	jurors	with	information	regarding	
damage	 awards	 in	 comparable	 cases	 ሺ“comparable‐case	 guidance”	 or	
“prior‐award	information”ሻ.	The	primary	objections	to	the	latter	approach	
are	 based	 on	 the	 argument	 that,	 because	 prior‐award	 information	 uses	
information	 regarding	 awards	 in	 distinct	 cases,	 it	 introduces	 the	
possibility	of	biasing	the	award,	or	distorting	the	award	size,	even	if	prior‐
award	information	reduces	the	variability	of	awards.	This	paper	responds	




related	 to	 the	 foregoing	 objections.	 We	 conclude	 that	 there	 is	 strong	
evidence	 that	 prior‐award	 information	 improves	 the	 “accuracy”	 of	
awards—that	 it	 significantly	 reduces	 the	 variability	 of	 awards,	 and	 that	
any	introduction	of	bias,	or	distortion	of	award	size,	is	minor	relative	to	its	
beneficial	 effect	 on	 variability.	 Furthermore,	 we	 conclude	 that	 there	 is	
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evidence	 that	 jurors	 respond	 to	 prior‐award	 information	 as	 predicted	 in	
recent	 literature,	 and	 in	 line	with	 the	 “optimal”	 use	 of	 such	 information;	



























standards	 in	 reviewing	 them.	 Consequently,	 these	 damage	 awards	 are	
notoriously	unpredictable.1	Courts	have	long	expressed	concern	regarding	
	
1.	 See	 Payne	 v.	 Jones,	 711	 F.3d	 85,	 94	 ሺ2d	 Cir.	 2013ሻ;	 Exxon	 Shipping	 Co.	 v.	
Baker,	554	U.S.	471,	499‐503	ሺ2008ሻ.	
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this	“virtually	unbridled	discretion”	of	juries,2	and	the	need	to	address	this	
“standardless,	 unguided	 exercise	 of	 discretion	 by	 the	 trier	 of	 fact,	
reviewable	.	.	.	 pursuant	 to	 no	 standard	 to	 guide	 the	 reviewing	 court	
either.”3	 Indeed,	 award	 unpredictability	 can	 cause	 failures	 in	 deterrence	
and	 “corrective	 justice”	 objectives,	 harm	 to	 economies,	 high	 insurance	
premiums,	and	loss	of	faith	in	the	legal	system.4	
Lawmakers	have	enacted	crude	measures,	such	as	damage	caps,	aimed	
at	 curbing	 award	 unpredictability,	 while	 largely	 ignoring	 less	 drastic	
alternatives	 that	 involve	 guiding	 jurors	 with	 information	 regarding	
damage	 awards	 in	 comparable	 cases	 ሺ“comparable‐case	 guidance”	 or	
“prior‐award	 information”ሻ.5	 The	 primary	 objections	 to	 the	 latter	
approach	 are	 based	 on	 the	 argument	 that,	 because	 prior‐award	
information	 uses	 information	 regarding	 awards	 in	 distinct	 cases,	 it	
introduces	 the	 possibility	 of	 biasing	 the	 award,	 or	 distorting	 the	 award	
size,	 even	 if	 prior‐award	 information	 reduces	 the	 variability	 of	 awards.6	
This	 article	 responds	 to	 these	 objections.	 In	 particular,	 it	 reports	 and	
interprets	 the	 results	 of	 a	 large	 randomized	 controlled	 trial	 designed	 to	
test	 juror	 behavior	 in	 response	 to	 prior‐award	 information	 and,	
specifically,	 to	 examine	 the	 effects	 of	 prior‐award	 information	 on	 both	
variability	 and	 bias	 under	 a	 range	 of	 conditions	 related	 to	 the	 foregoing	
objections.	
First,	 we	 examine	 whether	 prior‐award	 information	 reduces	 award	
unpredictability.	 Some	 authors	 have	 argued	 that	 providing	 prior	 awards	
that	 are	 themselves	 subject	 to	 arbitrariness	 may	 only	 exacerbate	 the	
	
2.	 Geressy	 v.	 Digital	 Equip.	 Corp.,	 980	 F.	 Supp.	 640,	 656	 ሺE.D.N.Y.	 1997ሻ	
ሺquoting	Leslie	A.	Rubin,	Note,	Confronting	a	New	Obstacle	to	Reproductive	
Choice:	 Encouraging	 the	 Development	 of	 RU‐486	 Through	 Reform	 of	
Products	Liability	Law,	18	N.Y.U.	REV.	L.	&	SOC.	CHANGE	131,	146	ሺ1990‐91ሻሻ.	
3.	 Jutzi‐Johnson	v.	United	States,	263	F.3d	753,	759	ሺ7th	Cir.	2001ሻ;	see	Hillel	J.	
Bavli,	 The	 Logic	 of	 Comparable‐Case	 Guidance	 in	 the	 Determination	 of	
Awards	for	Pain	and	Suffering	and	Punitive	Damages,	85	U.	CIN.	L.	REV.	1,	5‐8	
ሺ2017ሻ	ሾhereinafter	The	Logic	of	CCGሿ.	
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problem	 of	 unpredictability.7	 We	 address	 this	 argument	 by	 testing	 the	
effect	 of	 prior‐award	 information	 on	 the	 dispersion	 of	 awards	 under	
various	 conditions,	 including	 conditions	 related	 to	 the	 variability	 of	 the	
prior	 awards.	 We	 then	 confirm	 whether	 prior‐award	 information	 has	 a	
biasing	effect	on	damage	awards—that	is,	whether	it	causes	a	distortion	of	
award	size—where	the	prior‐award	information	arises	from	cases	that	are	
factually	 distinct	 from	 the	 present	 case.	 Then,	 to	 address	 the	 primary	
objections	 to	 prior‐award	 information,	 we	 analyze	 the	 effect	 of	 prior‐
award	information	on	variability	relative	to	bias.	Specifically,	we	develop	a	
framework	 for	 examining	 the	 effect	 of	 prior‐award	 information	 on	
“accuracy,”	which	we	define	in	terms	of	both	variability	and	bias.	
We	 conclude	 that	 there	 is	 strong	 evidence	 that	 prior‐award	
information	 reduces	 the	 unpredictability	 of	 damage	 awards	 while	 also	
introducing	 the	 possibility	 of	 biasing	 the	 awards.	 Most	 importantly,	 we	
find	strong	evidence	that	prior‐award	information	improves	the	accuracy	
of	 awards—that	 is,	 its	 beneficial	 effect	 on	 the	 dispersion	 of	 awards	
overwhelmingly	dominates	any	distortion	of	award	size.	This	occurs	even	
when	we	design	prior‐award	information	specifically	to	introduce	bias.	In	
particular,	 we	 simulate	 conditions	 under	 which	 a	 court,	 for	 whatever	




Additionally,	 we	 examine	 a	 number	 of	 “behavioral”	 effects	 and	 find	
evidence	 that	 jurors	 respond	 to	 prior‐award	 information	 as	 predicted	 in	
recent	literature	and	in	line	with	the	“optimal”	use	of	such	information.	We	
also	 find,	 based	 on	 our	 analysis	 of	 textual	 explanations	 provided	 by	
participants,	 that	prior‐award	 information	may	 cause	 jurors	 to	 approach	
award	determinations	more	thoughtfully	or	analytically.	
In	 Part	 II,	 we	 provide	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 problem—the	
unpredictability	of	awards	for	pain	and	suffering	and	punitive	damages—
and	 describe	 a	 number	 of	 methods	 proposed	 to	 address	 it,	 including	






pain‐and‐suffering	 awards,	 and	 if	we	 have	 no	method	 for	 determining	 the	
appropriate	award	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	why	should	we	make	prior	awards	
the	cornerstone	of	future	awards?	By	doing	so,	we	may	ensure	that	like	cases	
are	treated	alike	in	that	all	involve	inappropriate	damages	awards.”ሻ.	
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discuss	 limitations	 related	 to	 our	 methodology.	 Finally,	 in	 Part	 VI,	 we	
discuss	certain	implications	of	our	analysis	and	we	conclude.	
II.	 REDUCING	VARIABILITY	WITH	PRIOR‐AWARD	INFORMATION	
Awards	 for	 pain	 and	 suffering	 and	punitive	damages	 are	notoriously	
unpredictable.8	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 and	 lower	 courts	 have	 repeatedly	
emphasized	the	importance	of	addressing	the	“inherent	uncertainty	of	the	
trial	 process”9	 and	 the	 ruinous	 effects	 of	 such	 unpredictability.10	 Courts	
	
8.	 See	 Randall	 R.	 Bovbjerg	 et	 al.,	 Valuing	 Life	 and	 Limb	 in	 Tort:	 Scheduling	
“Pain	 and	 Suffering,”	 83	 NW.	 U.	 L.	 REV.	 908,	 919‐24	 ሺ1989ሻ	 ሺ“Tort	 law’s	
traditional	methods	of	computing	damages	for	personal	injury	and	death	are	
under	 attack—and	 understandably	 so.	 Legal	 reformers	 have	 long	 argued	
that	 present	 law,	 when	 combined	 with	 jury	 discretion,	 inflates	 damage	
awards	 and	 creates	 problematic	 outcome	 variability.	 The	 open‐ended	 and	
unpredictable	 nature	 of	 tort	 exposure	 has,	 in	 turn,	 threatened	 the	 liability	
insurance	system	that	funds	most	tort	compensation.”ሻ;	Chase,	supra	note	4,	
at	 768‐69	 ሺciting	 studiesሻ;	 Shari	 Seidman	 Diamond	 et	 al.,	 Juror	 Judgments	
About	 Liability	 and	 Damages:	 Sources	 of	 Variability	 and	Ways	 to	 Increase	
Consistency,	 48	 DEPAUL	 L.	 REV.	 301,	 317	 ሺ1998ሻ	 ሺexamining	 the	
“considerable	variation	 in	both	 juror	and	 jury	awards”ሻ;	David	W.	Leebron,	
Final	Moments:	Damages	For	Pain	and	Suffering	Prior	to	Death,	64	N.Y.U.	L.	
REV.	 256,	 259	 ሺ1989ሻ	 ሺ“The	 data	.	.	.	 suggest	 that	 tort	 awards	 for	 even	 this	
relatively	 simple	area	 ሾpain	 and	 suffering	prior	 to	deathሿ	vary	 significantly	
and	that	neither	the	specific	facts	of	the	case	nor	differing	theoretical	views	
of	the	functions	of	the	awards	can	explain	such	variation.”ሻ;	Joni	Hersch	&	W.	
Kip	 Viscusi,	 Punitive	 Damages:	 How	 Judges	 and	 Juries	 Perform,	 33	 J.	 LEG.	
STUD.	 1,	 1‐10	 ሺ2004ሻ	 ሺexamining	 unpredictable	 awards	 for	 punitive	
damagesሻ;	see	also	The	Logic	of	CCG,	supra	note	3,	at	1‐5	ሺciting	cases	and	
literatureሻ.	 But	 see	 Theodore	 Eisenberg	 et	 al.,	 Variability	 in	 Punitive	
Damages:	 Empirically	 Assessing	 Exxon	 Shipping	 Co.	 v.	 Baker,	 166	 J.	
INSTITUTIONAL	&	THEORETICAL	ECON.	5	ሺfinding	that	the	data	does	“not	support	
the	 unpredictability	 concern”ሻ;	 Yun‐chien	 Chang	 et	 al.,	 Pain	 and	 Suffering	
Damages	in	Personal	Injury	Cases:	An	Empirical	Study,	14	J.	EMPIRICAL	LEGAL	
STUD.	 199	 ሺ2017ሻ	 ሺ“ሾPሿain	 and	 suffering	 damages	 in	 Taiwan	 are	 to	 a	 large	
extent	 statistically	 and	 legally	 predictable.”ሻ.	 See	 generally	 Neil	 Vidmar	 &	
Mirya	 Holman,	 The	 Frequency,	 Predictability,	 and	 Proportionality	 of	 Jury	




10.	 Id.	 at	 499	 ሺ“The	 real	 problem,	 it	 seems,	 is	 the	 stark	 unpredictability	 of	
punitive	awards”;	 “ሾtሿhus,	a	penalty	should	be	reasonably	predictable	 in	 its	
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and	 commentators	 have	 proposed	 and	 implemented	 various	methods	 of	
addressing	 the	 unpredictability	 of	 awards	 for	 pain	 and	 suffering	 and	




whereby	 a	 court	 that	 finds	 an	 award	 to	 be	 inadequate	 or	 excessive	may	
order	a	new	trial	if	the	litigant	harmed	by	the	procedure	does	not	agree	to	
an	increase	ሺadditurሻ	or	a	reduction	ሺremittiturሻ	of	the	award.11	But	these	
devices	are	generally	 inadequate	as	 tools	 for	addressing	variability.	They	
	
severity,	so	that	even	Justice	Holmes’s	 ‘bad	man’	can	look	ahead	with	some	
ability	 to	 know	 what	 the	 stakes	 are	 in	 choosing	 one	 course	 of	 action	 or	
another.	And	when	 the	bad	man’s	 counterparts	 turn	up	 from	 time	 to	 time,	
the	penalty	scheme	they	face	ought	to	threaten	them	with	a	fair	probability	
of	 suffering	 in	 like	 degree	 when	 they	 wreak	 like	 damage.”	 ሺciting	 Oliver	
Wendell	Holmes,	 The	Path	 of	 the	 Law,	 10	HARV.	 L.	 REV.	 457,	 459	 ሺ1897ሻሻሻ;	
BMW	of	N.	Am.,	Inc.	v.	Gore,	517	U.S.	559,	574	ሺ1996ሻ	ሺ“Elementary	notions	
of	 fairness	 enshrined	 in	 our	 constitutional	 jurisprudence	 dictate	 that	 a	
person	 receive	 fair	 notice	 not	 only	 of	 the	 conduct	 that	will	 subject	 him	 to	
punishment,	but	also	of	the	severity	of	the	penalty	that	a	State	may	impose”ሻ;	
Payne	 v.	 Jones,	 711	F.3d	85,	 94	 ሺ2d	Cir.	 2013ሻ	 ሺ“Apart	 from	 impairing	 the	
fairness,	 predictability	 and	 proportionality	 of	 the	 legal	 system,	 judgments	
awarding	unreasonable	 amounts	as	damages	 impose	harmful,	 burdensome	
costs	 on	 society.”ሻ;	 Geressy	 v.	 Digital	 Equip.	 Corp.,	 980	 F.	 Supp.	 640,	 656	
ሺE.D.N.Y.	1997ሻ	ሺcommenting	on	the	“virtually	unbridled	discretion”	of	juries	
in	deciding	 awards	 for	pain	 and	 sufferingሻ;	 Chase,	 supra	note	4,	 at	 768‐69	
ሺ“Variability	is	a	problem	primarily	because	it	undermines	the	legal	system’s	
claim	that	like	cases	will	be	treated	alike;	the	promise	of	equal	justice	under	
law	 is	 an	 important	 justification	 for	 our	 legal	 system.	 Variability	 is	 also	
claimed	to	create	instrumental	defects	.	.	.	.”ሻ;	Bovbjerg	et	al.,	supra	note	8,	at	
908	 ሺ“Determination	 of	 awards	 on	 an	 ad	 hoc	 and	 unpredictable	 basis,	
especially	 for	 ‘non‐economic’	 losses	.	.	.	 tends	 to	 subvert	 the	 credibility	 of	
awards	 and	 hinder	 the	 efficient	 operation	 of	 the	 tort	 law’s	 deterrence	
function”ሻ;	 see	 also	 The	 Logic	 of	 CCG,	 supra	 note	 3,	 at	 5‐8	 ሺciting	 relevant	
cases	and	literatureሻ.	
11.	 See	 David	 Baldus	 et	 al.,	 Improving	 Judicial	 Oversight	 of	 Jury	 Damages	
Assessments:	A	Proposal	for	the	Comparative	Additur/Remittitur	Review	of	
Awards	 for	 Nonpecuniary	 Harms	 and	 Punitive	 Damages,	 80	 IOWA	 L.	 REV.	
1109,	1118‐20	ሺ1995ሻ.	
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are	applied	inconsistently	and	with	minimal	standards;12	they	are	used	to	
address	 only	 the	most	 extreme	 awards	 rather	 than	 variability	 generally;	
and	 regular	 use	 of	 such	 methods,	 and	 the	 replacement	 of	 jury	
determinations	 with	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	 court,	 would	 arguably	 raise	
significant	constitutional	problems	and	would	be	inconsistent	with	norms	
of	tort	 law.13	Additionally,	these	methods	serve	as	a	band‐aid	rather	than	
addressing	 the	 underlying	 problem—that	 juries	 receive	 insufficient	




of	 awards,	 such	 as	 punitive	 damages,	 or	 for	 damage	 awards	 generally.15	
However,	 damage	 caps	 address	 only	 extreme	 cases	 and	 only	 excessive	
awards.16	 Moreover,	 capping	 awards	 wholesale	 without	 regard	 for	 the	
individual	 circumstances	 of	 a	 case	 gives	 rise	 to	 fairness	 and	
proportionality	 concerns	 and	 can	 harm	 the	 deterrence	 objectives	 of	 tort	
law	 and	 disincentivize	 beneficial	 lawsuits.17	 It	 may	 cause	 constitutional	
concerns	as	well.18	
Third,	 a	 number	 of	 commentators	 have	 proposed	 using	 awards	 in	
comparable	 cases	 as	 guidance	 for	 award	determinations.	 These	methods	
	
12.	 Jutzi‐Johnson	 v.	 United	 States,	 263	 F.3d	 753,	 759	 ሺ7th	 Cir.	 2001ሻ	 ሺ“ሾMost	
courtsሿ	treat	the	determination	of	how	much	damages	for	pain	and	suffering	





52	 ሺ2002ሻ	 ሺarguing	 for	 a	 larger	 judicial	 role	 in	 determining	 punitive	
damagesሻ.	
14.	 Note	 that	The	Logic	of	CCG,	 supra	note	3,	proposes	 the	use	of	prior‐award	
information	in	addition	to	the	procedures	of	additur	and	remittitur—not	in	
place	of	them.	





18.	 Kathryn	 Zeiler,	 Turning	 from	 Damage	 Caps	 to	 Information	 Disclosure:	 An	
Alternative	 to	 Tort	 Reform,	 5	 YALE	 J.	 HEALTH	 POL’Y	 L.	 &	 ETHICS	 385,	 387	
ሺ2005ሻ.	
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have	 been	 proposed	 in	 various	 forms.	 Some	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 use	 of	
comparable	cases	to	develop	a	more	principled	approach	to	judicial	review	




of	 the	 jury’s	 discretion	 with	 that	 of	 the	 court	 arguably	 gives	 rise	 to	
constitutional	concerns	and	is	inconsistent	with	norms	of	tort	law.	Similar	
issues	 arise	 from	 methods	 that	 involve	 binding	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 to	 a	
particular	 award	or	 range	of	 awards,	 or	 that	predetermine	a	 schedule	of	
awards	 in	 advance	 of	 a	 case.	 These	 methods	 have	 been	 criticized	 as	
replacing	the	 jury’s	discretion	with	that	of	 the	court	or	a	 legislative	body	
altogether	removed	from	the	subject	case.20	
Some	 recommendations,	 however,	 involve	 “comparability	 analysis,”	
whereby	a	court	identifies	comparable	cases,	provides	the	trier	of	fact	with	
information	regarding	the	awards	in	these	cases,	and	instructs	the	trier	of	
fact	 to	 arrive	 at	 a	 damages	 award	 based	 on	 the	 evidence,	 using	 the	
comparable‐case	 information	 as	 guidance.21	 These	 recommendations	 are	
based	 on	 studies	 demonstrating	 that	 they	 are	 effective	 methods	 of	
controlling	 outlying	 awards	 and	 variability	 generally,	 even	 when	 the	
information	is	provided	as	non‐binding	guidance.22	
B.	 Prior‐Award	Information	
In	 this	paper,	we	 focus	on	 the	 specific	 type	of	 comparability	analysis	
called	 “comparable‐case	 guidance”	 ሺCCGሻ	 or	 “prior‐award	 information,”	
described	 in	 The	 Logic	 of	 CCG	 as	 information	 derived	 from	 prior	
	
19.	 See,	e.g.,	Baldus	et	al.,	supra	note	11.	
20.	 The	 Logic	 of	 CCG,	 supra	 note	 3,	 at	 10;	 see	 Logan,	 supra	 note	 6,	 at	 942‐43	
ሺ“Such	 an	 approach	 would	 streamline	 litigation	 and	 greatly	 limit,	 if	 not	
eliminate,	the	concerns	with	variability	and	fairness	that	the	current	practice	
risks	 by	 treating	 like	 cases	 differently.	 However,	 this	 approach	 is	 fatally	
flawed	because	 it	 eviscerates	 the	various	 contributions	 that	 juries	make	 to	
the	 civil	 justice	 system.	 Moreover,	 this	 approach	 is	 fundamentally	
inconsistent	with	 the	 basic	 tort	 principle	 that	 each	 victim	 is	 entitled	 to	 an	
award	 tailored	 to	 his	 or	 her	 circumstances,	 set	 by	 a	 lay	 jury.”	 ሺciting	
RESTATEMENT	ሺSECONDሻ	OF	TORTS	§	901	cmt.	a	ሺAM.	LAW	INST.	1979ሻሻሻ.	
21.	 The	Logic	of	CCG,	supra	note	3,	at	3.	
22.	 See	Michael	 J.	 Saks	et	al.,	Reducing	Variability	 in	Civil	 Jury	Awards,	21	L.	&	
HUM.	BEHAV.	243,	249‐55	ሺ1997ሻ.	










Judge	 Posner,	 notwithstanding	 “ሾvሿarious	 solutions,	 none	 wholly	
satisfactory,	ሾthatሿ	have	been	suggested,”	“ሾmሿost	courts	do	not	follow	any	
of	 these	 approaches.	 Instead,	 they	 treat	 the	 determination	 of	 how	much	
damages	 for	 pain	 and	 suffering	 to	 award	 as	 a	 standardless,	 unguided	
exercise	of	discretion	by	the	trier	of	fact,	reviewable	for	abuse	of	discretion	
pursuant	 to	 no	 standard	 to	 guide	 the	 reviewing	 court	 either.”26	 He	
concluded	 that	 “ሾtሿo	minimize	 the	arbitrary	variance	 in	awards	bound	 to	




obligation	 to	 set	 forth	 in	 his	 opinion	 the	 damages	 awards	 that	 he	














their	 award	 distributions	 to	 juries	 for	 guidance	 in	 reaching	 their	 general	
damages	 awards	 and	 to	 judges	 for	 conducting	 their	 additur/remittitur	
reviews”ሻ;	Chase,	supra	note	4,	at	775,	777‐90	ሺdiscussing	recommendation	
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However,	calls	 for	such	methods	have	generally	 failed,	 in	part	due	 to	
objections	 based	 on	 their	 reliance	 on	 a	 court’s	 ability	 to	 identify	 an	
appropriate	 set	 of	 “comparable”	 cases.29	 First,	 some	 authors	 have	
questioned	whether	 prior‐award	 information	 can	 increase	 predictability,	
notwithstanding	 the	 unpredictability	 of	 the	 prior	 awards	 themselves.30	
Second,	 and	 most	 prominently,	 commentators	 have	 argued	 that,	 even	
assuming	 that	 prior‐award	 information	 reduces	 unpredictability,	 its	
reliance	on	awards	arising	from	distinct	cases	introduces	the	possibility	of	
biasing	 the	 award,	 or	 distorting	 the	 size	 of	 the	 award.	 The	 fundamental	
issue	 is	 therefore	 not	 simply	 whether	 prior‐award	 information	 reduces	
variability.	It	is	whether	it	reduces	variability	relative	to	any	introduction	
of	bias.31	
Therefore,	 we	 address	 these	 objections	 by	 examining	 the	 effect	 of	
prior‐award	information	on	“error”—or,	inversely,	“accuracy”—which	we	
define	 in	 terms	of	both	variability	 and	bias.32	Conceptually,	 accuracy	 can	
be	understood	as	reflecting	the	idea	that	a	damages	award	can	be	“better”	
or	“worse”	based	on	societal	objectives	and	norms.33	For	purposes	of	this	
paper,	we	use	 the	 term	 in	a	specific	way:	we	 improve	 the	accuracy	of	an	
award	if	we	reduce	the	unpredictability	of	the	award	without	introducing	
“too	 much”	 bias.	 In	 Part	 III,	 we	 provide	 formal	 definitions	 of	 accuracy,	
error,	 variability,	 and	bias	within	 the	 context	 of	 our	 experiment,	 and	we	
	
method	 involving	 charts	 providing	 nonbinding	 guidance	 “to	 allow	
comparison	 with	 roughly	 similar	 cases	 in	 which	 plaintiffs’	 verdicts	 were	
recovered”ሻ	ሺquoting	Report	of	the	Action	Commission	to	Improve	the	Tort	
Liability	System,	AM.	BAR	ASSOC.	10‐15	ሺ1987ሻሻ;	Logan,	supra	note	6,	at	939‐












33.	 Courts	 arguably	 recognize	 this	 when,	 for	 example,	 they	 use	 tools	 such	 as	
additur	and	remittitur.	
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explain	 how	 much	 bias	 is	 “too	 much,”	 so	 as	 to	 reduce	 accuracy.	 Here,	
however,	let	us	examine	these	notions	in	further	detail	conceptually.	
Previous	 literature	 has	 modeled	 a	 damages	 award	 as	 an	 estimation	
problem	 in	 which	 an	 actual	 award	 serves	 as	 an	 estimate	 of	 a	 “correct”	
award	that	would	reflect	complete	information	regarding	the	law	and	the	
facts	 of	 a	 claim.	 In	 this	 approach,	 the	 error	 associated	with	 the	 estimate	
represents	the	distance	between	the	actual	award	and	the	correct	award.34	
In	turn,	according	to	this	model,	error	can	be	deconstructed	into	variance	
and	 bias.35	 Variance	 is	 a	 measure	 of	 dispersion	 around	 a	 mean,	 or	 an	
“expected,”	 award	 value.	 Bias,	meanwhile,	 is	 a	measure	 of	 the	 difference	
between	 the	 expected	 award	 and	 the	 correct	 award.	 “If	 ሾthe	 estimation	
processሿ	is	‘unbiased,’	then	it	will	generate	the	correct	value	on	average.	If	
it	 is	 ‘biased,’	 then	it	will	generate	the	 incorrect	value	on	average,	and	the	
‘bias’	reflects	the	distance	between	the	value	the	ሾthe	estimation	processሿ	
generates	on	average	and	the	correct	value.”36	Unbiasedness	is	generally	a	
desirable	 feature	 of	 an	 estimation	 process,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 imply	 the	
	
34.	 The	Logic	of	CCG,	 supra	note	3,	 at	12	 ሺciting	Hillel	 J.	Bavli,	Aggregating	 for	
Accuracy:	A	Closer	Look	at	Sampling	and	Accuracy	in	Class	Action	Litigation,	
14	 L.,	 PROBABILITY	 &	 RISK	 67,	 74‐78	 ሺ2015ሻ	 ሾhereinafter	 Aggregating	 for	
Accuracyሿሻ.	 Note	 that	 we	 can	 similarly	 define	 a	 distribution	 of	 “correct”	
awards	 reflecting,	 for	 example,	 uncertainty	 regarding	 the	 law.	 See	 Hillel	 J.	
Bavli,	Sampling	and	Reliability	 in	Class	Action	Litigation,	2016	CARD.	L.	REV.	
DE	NOVO	207,	209	n.16	ሺ2016ሻ.	The	Logic	of	CCG	follows	previous	 literature	
that	 characterizes	 a	 “correct”	 award	 as	 “the	 mean	 of	 the	 population	 of	
possible	 awards	 that	would	 emerge	 from	 adjudicating	 the	 case	 repeatedly	
under	various	conditions	ሺe.g.,	before	different	judges	and	juries,	by	different	
attorneys,	 with	 different	 permutations	 of	 facts,	 etc.ሻ.”	 The	 Logic	 of	 CCG,	
supra	note	3,	at	13	ሺciting	Aggregating	for	Accuracy,	supra	note	34,	at	74‐78;	
Michael	 J.	 Saks	&	 Peter	David	Blanck,	 Justice	 Improved:	 The	Unrecognized	
Benefits	of	Aggregation	and	Sampling	in	the	Trial	of	Mass	Torts,	44	STAN.	L.	
REV.	 815,	 833‐34	 ሺ1992ሻሻ.	 This	 characterization	 is	 intended	 to	 capture	
various	interpretations	of	the	law,	the	facts	of	the	case,	norms,	etc.	The	Logic	
of	 CCG,	 supra	 note	 3,	 at	 13	 n.51.	 There	 are	 in	 fact	 many	 reasonable	
definitions	 for	 the	 “correct”	 award	 in	 a	 case.	 Even	 using	 the	
conceptualization	 above,	 other	measures	 of	 central	 tendency—such	 as	 the	
median—may	be	used,	depending	on	our	beliefs	 regarding	 the	best	way	 to	
characterize	 the	 “correct”	 award	 ሺe.g.,	 whether	 we	 want	 to	 capture	
information	regarding	extreme	values,	etc.ሻ.	We	adopt	this	characterization;	









then	 repetitions	 of	 an	 unbiased	 adjudication	 may	 generate	
estimate	 values	 ሺi.e.,	 damage	 awardsሻ	 of	 $0,	 $50,000,	 $150,000,	
and	 $200,000,	which	 are	 indeed	 centered	 at	 the	 correct	 value	 of	
$100,000;	 however,	 the	 awards	 are	 highly	 dispersed	 around	
$100,000.	We	 would,	 for	 example,	 prefer	 that	 repeated	
adjudications	generate	the	values	$90,000,	$95,000,	$105,000,	and	
$110,000;	 or	 even	 better,	 $100,000,	 $100,000,	 $100,000,	 and	
$100,000.38	
Therefore,	 variance,	 a	 measure	 of	 such	 dispersion,	 is	 also	 a	 crucial	
component	of	error.39	Indeed,	some	circumstances	may	involve	a	tradeoff	
between	 bias	 and	 variance,	 where	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 introduce	 the	
possibility	 of	 some	 bias	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 substantial	 reductions	 in	
variance	 and,	 on	 balance,	 significant	 improvements	 in	 accuracy.	 For	
example,	if	the	correct	award	in	a	case	is	$100,000,	it	may	be	preferable	to	
have	 an	 estimation	 process	 that	 generates	 the	 values	 $90,000,	 $93,000,	
$97,000,	and	$100,000	rather	 than	$0,	$50,000,	$150,000,	and	$200,000,	
even	though	the	latter	set	is	unbiased	and	therefore	centered	at	the	correct	
award	 while	 the	 former	 set	 is	 biased	 and	 therefore	 centered	 at	 the	
incorrect	 award.	 Specifically,	 the	 former	 set	 may	 be	 preferable	 because,	
while	it	involves	some	bias,	the	bias	is	modest	ሺthe	mean	of	the	four	values	
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Thus,	 in	 terms	 of	 bias	 and	 variance,	 prior‐award	 information	 is	
hypothesized	 to	cause	a	reduction	 in	variance	by	providing	 jurors	with	a	
context	 to	 guide	 their	 decision,	 or	 some	 form	 of	 “anchor,”42	 but	 at	 the	
inherent	 cost	 of	 introducing	 the	 risk	 of	 bias	 by	 providing	 award	
information	from	cases	that	are	not	identical	to	the	subject	case.43	
Importantly,	 for	 purposes	 of	 this	 paper,	 it	 is	 unnecessary	 to	 assume	
the	 existence	 of	 a	 correct	 award.	 We	 are	 concerned	 only	 with	 whether	
prior‐award	 information	 improves	 or	 harms	 the	 accuracy	 of	 an	 award	
relative	 to	 what	 the	 award	 would	 be	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 prior‐award	
information.	 In	 this	 sense,	 rather	 than	 requiring	 a	 correct	 award,	 our	
argument	 relies	 on	 two	 assumptions:	 that	 reducing	 the	 variability	 of	 an	




award	 promotes	 a	 conservative	 analysis.	 Specifically,	 as	 in	 previous	
literature,	 we	 define	 the	 correct	 award	 associated	 with	 a	 claim	 as	 the	
average	 of	 repeated	 adjudications	 of	 a	 claim	 without	 prior‐award	
information.44	 For	 example,	 we	 assume	 that	 if	 a	 court	 had	 unlimited	
resources,	 it	would	 prefer	 to	 adjudicate	 a	 claim	numerous	 times	 ሺbefore	
numerous	 juries,	 etc.ሻ	 and	 use	 the	 average	 adjudication	 as	 the	 ultimate	
damages	award.	This	allows	for	the	foregoing	assumptions—that	reducing	
variance	is	good	and	introducing	bias	is	bad—by	assuming	that	the	award‐
generating	 process	 is	 initially	 unbiased.	 Again,	 this	 assumption	 of	
unbiasedness	 is	 not	 necessary	 for	 our	 results;	 indeed,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	
damage	awards	are	entirely	unbiased.	Rather,	we	include	this	assumption	
for	 purposes	 of	 convenience	 and	 to	 promote	 conservative	 estimates	 by	
ensuring	 that	 any	 bias	 introduced	 by	 prior‐award	 information	 counts	 as	
“bad”	in	the	sense	of	reducing	accuracy	ሺin	actuality,	if	an	award	is	in	fact	
biased,	 introducing	bias	 through	prior‐award	 information	 could	 improve	
accuracy	by	negating	the	preexisting	biasሻ.	
Earlier	 articles	 have	 used	 statistical	 theory	 and	 modeling	
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robust	 set	 of	 conditions	 regarding	 the	 actual	 comparability	 of	 the	 cases	
underlying	 the	 prior	 awards	 relative	 to	 the	 subject	 case.	 These	
“comparability”	conditions	are	defined	in	terms	of	both	the	“misalignment”	
of	 the	prior	 cases	with	 the	present	 case—i.e.,	 the	difference	between	 the	
mean	of	the	correct	awards	in	the	prior	cases	and	the	correct	award	in	the	
subject	 case—and	 the	 substantive	 ሺor	 factualሻ	 variability	 of	 the	 prior	
cases,	 reflected	 in	 the	 variance	 of	 the	 prior	 awards.45	 The	 Logic	 of	 CCG	
discussed	 methods	 for	 identifying	 comparable	 cases	 and	 extracting	
comparable‐case	 information	 for	 consideration	 by	 a	 jury.	 This	 process	
does	 not	 require	 a	 reinvention	 of	 the	 wheel:	 courts	 have	 used	
comparability	 analyses	 in	 various	 contexts	 and	 these	 contexts	 provide	
good	guidance	for	developing	comparable‐case	information	to	guide	juries	
in	 their	 determinations	 of	 awards	 for	 pain	 and	 suffering	 and	 punitive	
damages.46	 For	 example,	 courts	 have	 used	 comparability	 analysis	 for	
purposes	 of	 additur	 and	 remittitur,	 on	 appeal	 in	 reviewing	 awards	 for	
excessiveness,	 and	 in	 various	 substantive	 contexts,	 such	 as	 challenges	 to	
compensation	in	the	takings	context.47	
A	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 methods	 for	 developing	 comparable‐case	
information	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 article.	 But	 as	 discussed	 in	 The	
Logic	 of	 CCG,	 courts	 should	 be	 concerned	 with	 balancing	 three	 factors	
when	 developing	 such	 information:	 “the	 ሾfactualሿ	 alignment	 of	 the	 prior	
cases	with	the	subject	case,	the	ሾfactualሿ	breadth	of	the	prior	cases,	and	the	
number	 of	 prior	 cases.”48	As	 courts	 have	done	 in	 other	 contexts,	 a	 court	
might	 provide	 guidance	 to	 litigation	 parties	 for	 identifying	 comparable	
cases	 and	 then	 “selectሾሿ	 a	 final	 set	 of	 cases	 from	a	pool	 identified	by	 the	
litigants	 and	 the	 court.”49	 Further,	 courts	 can	 implicitly	 involve	 jurors	 in	
the	 selection	 process	 by	 including	 fact	 summaries	 of	 the	 selected	 prior	
cases	 in	 the	 presentation	 of	 comparable‐case	 information.50	 Of	 course,	
methods	 for	 identifying	 prior	 cases	 and	 distilling	 information	 for	
	
45.	 See	 id.	 at	 15‐24;	 Hillel	 J.	 Bavli	 &	 Yang	 Chen,	 Shrinkage	 Estimation	 in	 the	
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presentation	 to	 a	 jury	must	 be	 balanced	 against	 accompanying	 litigation	
costs.51	
Ultimately,	 these	 earlier	 articles	 on	 comparable‐case	 guidance	 have	
concluded	 that	 the	 accuracy	 benefits	 of	 prior‐award	 information	 are	 not	
very	 sensitive	 to	 a	 court’s	 ability	 to	 identify	 a	 set	 of	 comparable	 cases.	
They	conclude	that,	absent	very	substantial	error	in	selecting	prior	cases,	
any	 introduction	 of	 bias	 caused	 by	 prior‐award	 information	 would	 be	
minimal	 relative	 to	 the	 beneficial	 reduction	 in	 the	 random	 variation	 of	
awards,	 and	 that,	 given	 a	 reasonable	method	 for	 identifying	 prior	 cases,	
providing	 jurors	 with	 prior‐award	 information	 would	 improve	 the	
accuracy	of	award	determinations.52	
Thus,	 our	 aim	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 test	 whether	 these	 effects	 hold	
empirically,	 and	 whether	 they	 result	 from	 the	mechanisms	 described	 in	
the	 foregoing	models.	Our	 study	differs	 from	previous	 studies	 in	 that	we	
aim	particularly	to	address	the	primary	objections	to	these	methods	in	the	
literature	by	 focusing	explicitly	on	the	effects	of	prior‐award	 information	
on	 the	 accuracy	 of	 awards	 under	 a	 range	 of	 conditions	 related	 to	 the	
selection	 of	 prior	 awards.53	 In	 the	 following	 part,	 we	 explain	 our	







determinations	 and	methods	 of	 addressing	 it.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Baldus	 et	 al.,	 supra	
note	11;	Bovbjerg	et	al.,	supra	note	8;	Diamond	et	al.,	supra	note	8;	Leebron,	
supra	note	8;	 Saks	et	 al.,	 supra	note	22;	Catherine	M.	 Sharkey,	Unintended	
Consequences	 of	Medical	Malpractice	 Damages	 Caps,	 80	 N.Y.U.	 L.	 REV.	 391	
ሺ2005ሻ;	 see	 also	 Chase,	 supra	 note	 4;	 Sanders,	 supra	 note	 15,	 at	 496‐507	
ሺsummarizing	proposals	and	studiesሻ.	The	experiment	by	Professor	Saks	et	
al.,	 supra	 note	 22,	 is	most	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 current	 study.	 That	 study	
investigated	 the	 effects	 of	 prior	 awards	 in	 various	 forms,	 as	well	 as	 a	 “cap	
condition,”	on	the	amounts	awarded	for	pain	and	suffering	in	personal	injury	
cases—and	specifically,	with	respect	to	award	variability	and	“distortions”	in	
the	amounts	awarded.	See	 id.	 at	246‐47.	The	authors	 found	 that	 “interval,”	
“average‐plus‐interval,”	and	“examples”	conditions—involving	prior	awards	
that,	in	the	terms	of	the	current	paper,	were	“aligned”	with	the	subject	cases	
based	 on	 pilot	 studies—caused	 a	 reduction	 in	 variability	 while	 distorting	
award	amounts	minimally	or	not	at	all.	See	id.	at	246.	They	also	found	that	
the	 “cap”	 condition	 performed	 poorly	 and	 sometimes	 increased	 the	
variability	and	size	of	awards.	See	id.	at	253.	
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III.	 METHODOLOGY	
To	 test	 the	 effects	 of	 prior‐award	 information	 on	 the	 spread,	
magnitude,	 and	 accuracy	 of	 awards	 for	 pain	 and	 suffering	 and	 punitive	
damages	 we	 conducted	 a	 randomized	 controlled	 trial	 ሺRCTሻ	 using	 a	
factorial	design	and	 the	potential‐outcomes	 framework.54	Specifically,	we	
exposed	 each	 participant	 to	 a	 “treatment	 combination”	 ሺor	 “treatment	
condition”ሻ	 arising	 from	 a	 set	 of	 “factors”	 reflecting	 the	 prior‐award	
conditions	 of	 interest.	 In	 each	 treatment	 condition,	we	 set	 each	 of	 these	
factors	 to	 a	 certain	 value,	 or	 “level.”55	We	 then	 drew	 causal	 conclusions	
based	on	inferences	about	what	an	outcome	would	be	under	exposure	to	
alternative	 treatment	 conditions.56	 In	 this	 part,	 we	 describe	 our	








We	 used	 Amazon’s	 Mechanical	 Turk	 to	 recruit	 and	 administer	 the	
experiment	 to	 approximately	 5,500	 participants	 in	 Leg	 I	 and	 2,500	
participants	in	Leg	II.	We	restricted	participation	to	U.S.	citizens	who	were	
eighteen	 or	 older	 and	 English‐speaking,	 the	 baseline	 eligibility	
requirements	 for	 serving	 on	 a	 U.S.	 jury.57	 Participants	 enrolled	 in	 the	
	
54.	 See	 Tirthankar	 Dasgupta,	 Natesh	 S.	 Pillai,	 &	 Donald	 B.	 Rubin,	 Causal	
Inference	from	2K	Factorial	Designs	by	Using	Potential	Outcomes,	77	J.	ROYAL	
STAT.	 SOC.	 SERIES	 B	 ሺSTAT.	 METHODOLOGYሻ	 727,	 727	 ሺ2015ሻ	 ሾhereinafter	 2K	
Factorial	Designsሿ;	Donald	B.	Rubin,	Estimating	Causal	Effects	of	Treatments	
in	Randomized	and	Nonrandomized	Studies,	66	J.	EDUC.	PSYCHOL.	688	ሺ1974ሻ.	
We	 use	 the	 notation	 and	 general	 framework	 established	 in	 2K	 Factorial	
Designs	 but	 extend	 the	 notation	 to	 accommodate	 the	 additional	 levels	
present	in	this	experiment.	
55.	 See	generally	2K	Factorial	Designs,	supra	note	54.	
56.	 See	 generally	 Rubin,	 supra	 note	 54,	 at	 689‐90;	 C.	 F.	 JEFF	WU	 &	 MICHAEL	 S.	
HAMADA,	EXPERIMENTS:	PLANNING,	ANALYSIS,	AND	OPTIMIZATION	ሺ2d	ed.	2009ሻ.	
57.	 Mechanical	 Turk	 requires	 that	 all	 participants	 be	 eighteen	 or	 older	 and	
English‐speaking.	We	attempted	to	enforce	the	U.S.	citizenship	requirement	
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experiment	 sequentially	 and	 were	 randomly	 assigned	 to	 receive	 one	 of	
twenty‐two	 treatment	 conditions,	 which	 determined	 what	 prior‐award	
information,	 if	any,	a	participant	received	as	guidance	for	her	response.58	
For	 each	 treatment	 condition,	 participants	 were	 provided	 a	 fact	 pattern	
and	 jury	 instructions	 that	 included	 guidance,	 specific	 to	 the	 assigned	
treatment	condition,	for	determining	a	damages	award.	Participants	were	
then	 asked	 to	 determine	 a	 damages	 award,	 provide	 an	 optional	
explanation,	and	provide	certain	demographic	information.59	
Each	 treatment	 condition	 contained	 one	 of	 two	 fact	 patterns.	




defect,	 the	 airbags	would	 fail	 to	 deploy	 in	 a	 small	 proportion	 of	
frontal	 collisions.	 The	 lawsuit	 was	 brought	 by	 a	 driver,	 Andrew,	
who	suffered	severe	brain	injury	from	a	frontal	collision	caused	by	
ice	 on	 the	 road.	 He	 now	 lives	 with	 headaches,	 blurred	 vision,	
speech	 impairment,	 and	memory	 loss.	At	 trial,	 it	was	established	








sizes	 across	 treatment	 groups.	 This	 scheme	 maintains	 the	 properties	 of	




59.	 Participants	 received	 $0.20	 to	 $0.30	 for	 their	 participation	 in	 the	 survey.	
Participants	were	also	given	the	opportunity	to	provide	feedback	regarding	
the	 survey.	 We	 used	 two	 measures	 to	 confirm	 that	 participants	 were	
attentive	 rather	 than	completing	 the	survey	arbitrarily.	First,	we	examined	
the	 amount	 of	 time	 that	 participants	 took	 to	 complete	 the	 survey,	 which	
comported	 with	 our	 expectations;	 and	 we	 examined	 the	 proportion	 of	
participants	 who	 provided	 optional	 explanations,	 which	 was	 high—about	
75‐80%.	While	we	used	explanations	as	a	signal	for	attentiveness,	we	did	not	
interpret	the	absence	of	an	explanation	as	a	signal	of	inattentiveness.	




You	 are	 a	 juror	 in	 a	 trial	 in	 which	 a	 company	 intentionally	
disposed	of	its	industrial	waste	by	regularly	dumping	it	into	a	local	
river	rather	than	having	the	expense	of	disposing	it	properly.	The	
lawsuit	 was	 brought	 by	 Emma,	 a	 29‐year‐old	 woman	 whose	
drinking	 water	 was	 affected	 by	 the	 improper	 disposal	 and	 who	
developed	 a	 rare	 cancer	 as	 a	 result.	 Three	 years	 before	 her	
diagnosis,	 Emma	 married	 her	 college	 boyfriend.	 She	 and	 her	
husband	now	have	a	two‐year‐old	daughter.	Emma	has	undergone	
multiple	 surgeries	 and	 months	 of	 chemotherapy	 and	 radiation	
therapy,	 but	 doctors	 have	 recently	 informed	 her	 that	 the	 cancer	
has	spread	and	that	her	likelihood	of	survival	beyond	six	months	is	
very	low.	Since	her	diagnosis	one	year	ago,	she	has	suffered	from	







He	 informs	 you	 that,	 through	 a	 separate	 proceeding,	 Andrew	 has	
already	 been	 compensated	 for	 his	 injuries,	 including	 his	 medical	
expenses	 and	 his	 pain	 and	 suffering.	 The	 judge	 instructs	 you	 that	
your	 role	 now	 is	 to	 determine	 a	 “punitive	 damages”	 award.	 He	






that	 “there	 is	no	exact	 standard	 for	determining	punitive	damages.	
You	 should	 decide	 on	 an	 amount	 that	 you	 find	 necessary	 for	
achieving	 the	 objectives	 described	 above.	 You	 should	 consider	 the	
degree	 of	 reprehensibility	 of	 the	 defendant’s	 misconduct	 and	 the	
actual	or	potential	harm	suffered	by	the	plaintiff.”	
	 See	 JOHN	 J.	 KIRCHER	 &	 CHRISTINE	 M.	 WISEMAN,	 1	 PUNITIVE	 DAMAGES:	 LAW	 AND	
PRACTICE	2d	§	11:8	ሺ2018	ed.ሻ	ሺcontaining	pattern	jury	instructions	adapted	
for	the	surveyሻ.	




punitive	 damages	 or	 pain	 and	 suffering	 ሺdepending	 on	 the	 participant’s	
assigned	 fact	 patternሻ.	 Participants	 assigned	 to	 one	 of	 twenty	 active	
treatment	 conditions,	 however,	 were	 additionally	 provided	 certain	
information	 regarding	 awards	 in	 prior	 “comparable”	 cases.	 For	 example,	
they	may	have	been	provided	with	a	paragraph	similar	to	the	following:	
Additionally,	 the	 judge	 informs	 you	 that	 in	 five	 previous	 similar	
cases	 juries	 have	 determined	 awards	 for	 ሾpunitive	 damages	 or	
pain	 and	 sufferingሿ	 in	 the	 amounts	 of	 ሾ$____________,	 $____________,	
$____________,	 $____________,	 and	 $____________ሿ.	 The	 judge	 indicates	
that	 this	 information	 regarding	 prior	 awards	 is	 intended	 as	
guidance	only,	and	that	you	may	use	ሺor	not	useሻ	the	information	
as	you	see	appropriate.	
The	 form	 and	 substance	 of	 the	 numerical	 prior‐award	 values	 were	
based	 on	 the	 treatment	 condition	 to	 which	 a	 participant	 was	 randomly	
assigned—and	 particularly,	 based	 on	 the	 levels	 of	 scenario,	 bias,	
variability,	 and	 form	 associated	 with	 that	 treatment	 condition.	 These	
values	are	discussed	in	the	following	subsection.	
	




for	 enjoyment	 of	 life.	 He	 informs	 you	 that,	 through	 a	 separate	
proceeding,	Emma	has	already	been	compensated	for	her	monetary	
costs,	such	as	past	and	future	medical	expenses.	The	judge	instructs	
you	 that	 your	 role	 now	 is	 to	 determine	 an	 award	 for	 Emma’s	
physical	 and	 mental	 pain	 and	 suffering	 ሺpast	 and	 futureሻ	 and	 her	
loss	of	capacity	for	enjoyment	of	life.	The	judge	emphasizes	that	“no	
evidence	of	the	value	of	intangible	things,	such	as	mental	or	physical	
pain	 and	 suffering,	 has	 been	 or	 need	 be	 introduced.	 You	 are	 not	
trying	to	determine	value,	but	an	amount	that	will	fairly	compensate	
the	 plaintiff	 for	 the	 damages	 she	 has	 suffered.	 There	 is	 no	 exact	
standard	 for	 fixing	 the	 compensation	 to	 be	 awarded	 for	 these	
elements	of	damage.”	You	should	use	your	judgment	to	decide	a	fair	
amount.	
	 See	 PATTERN	 CIV.	 JURY	 INSTR.	 5TH	 CIR.	 §	 15.3	 ሺCOMMITTEE	 ON	 PATTERN	 JURY	
INSTRUCTIONS,	 DISTRICT	 JUDGES	 ASSOCIATION,	 FIFTH	 CIRCUIT	 2014ሻ	 ሺcontaining	
pattern	jury	instructions	adapted	for	the	surveyሻ.	
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B.	 Treatment	Conditions	
As	 discussed,	 the	 two	 control	 conditions	 involved	 no	 prior‐award	
information	and	involved	either	a	punitive	damages	scenario	or	a	pain	and	
suffering	 scenario.62	 Each	 of	 the	 twenty	 active	 treatment	 conditions	
involved	a	combination	of	four	experimental	factors:	scenario	ሺtwo	levelsሻ,	
form	ሺthree	 levelsሻ,	bias	 ሺtwo	 levelsሻ,	 and	variability	 ሺtwo	 levelsሻ,	where	






For	 example,	 a	 participant	 assigned	 to	 the	 treatment	 condition	 that	
involves	ሾscenario	ൌ	pain	and	suffering,	form	ൌ	list,	bias	ൌ	unbiased,	and	
variability	 ൌ	 high	 variabilityሿ	 received	 a	 stimulus	 that	 asked	 the	
participant	 to	 determine	 an	 award	 for	 pain	 and	 suffering,	 and	 provided	
unbiased	high‐variability	prior‐award	information	in	the	form	of	a	list.63	
To	 determine	 the	 numerical	 values	 that	 would	 define	 each	 active	
treatment	 condition,	 we	 conducted	 a	 pilot	 study	 ሺnൌ400ሻ	 that	
substantively	replicated	the	control	conditions	of	the	main	study,	and	we	
used	the	distributions	of	the	award	determinations	in	the	pilot	study	as	a	
reference	 for	 defining	 levels	 of	 bias	 and	 variability.	 For	 each	 level	 of	
scenario,	we	used	the	median	of	award	amounts	in	the	corresponding	pilot	
sample	 as	 the	 unbiased	 average64	 and	 the	 30th	 percentile	 of	 award	
	
62.	 For	purposes	of	 the	factorial	design,	 the	control	conditions	can	together	be	
viewed	as	a	separate	factorial	experiment.	
63.	 By	 design,	 certain	 levels	 of	 certain	 factors	 are	 incompatible	 with	 certain	
levels	 of	 other	 factors.	 In	 particular,	 the	 variability	 factor	 is	 not	 applicable	
when	 prior‐award	 information	 is	 presented	 in	 the	 average	 form.	 Also,	 as	
previously	 stated,	 for	 control	 conditions,	 only	 the	 scenario	 factor	 is	
applicable.	
64.	 Implicit	 in	 our	 terminology	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 correct	 award	 for	 each	
scenario.	See	supra	Section	 II.B.	We	defined	 the	correct	award	consistently	
with	 previous	 literature,	 as	 the	 mean	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 awards	 that	




be	 too	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 a	 few	 extreme	 outliers	 in	 the	 relatively	 small	
control	samples	ሺrelative	to	infinitely	repeated	adjudicationsሻ.	Also,	extreme	
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amounts	 as	 the	biased	 average.65	Additionally,	 for	 each	 level	 of	 scenario,	
we	used	the	15th,	25th,	50th,	75th,	and	85th	percentiles	of	award	amounts	
in	the	corresponding	pilot	sample	as	the	unbiased	high‐variability	list,	and	
the	 40th,	 45th,	 50th,	 55th,	 and	 60th	 percentiles	 as	 the	 unbiased	 low‐
variability	 list.	 Finally,	 for	 each	 level	 of	 scenario,	 we	 used	 the	 15th	 and	
85th	 percentiles	 of	 the	 award	 amounts	 from	 the	 corresponding	 pilot	







provided	 to	 participants	 in	 the	 main	 study	 in	 each	 active	 treatment	
condition.	
	
outliers	 are	 far	 less	 likely	 in	 real‐world	 trials	 involving	 actual	 juries	 and	
presided	 over	 by	 judges.	 See	 infra	 Part	 V.	 In	 any	 event,	 our	 conclusions	
would	 not	 be	 weakened	 were	 we	 to	 analyze	 the	 effects	 of	 interest	 with	
reference	 to	 the	results	 in	 the	control	condition	directly,	without	reference	
to	 a	 correct	 award.	 For	 example,	 without	 taking	 a	 position	 on	 how	 to	
characterize	a	correct	award,	we	could	 investigate	the	effect	of	a	particular	
treatment	condition	on	magnitude,	relative	to	the	magnitude	of	the	award	in	
the	 control	 condition.	 After	 all,	 prior‐award	 information	 is	 intended	 to	
improve	accuracy	by	reducing	error	from	dispersion	substantially	more	than	
it	 adds	 error	 from	distortion—whatever	 the	 initial	 “distortion”	may	 be.	As	
discussed	 supra	 Section	 II.B,	 by	 referencing	 a	 correct	 award,	 we	 simply	
assume	 that	 the	 award	 determination	 is	 initially	 undistorted,	 or	 unbiased;	
and	we	assume	that	any	distortion	of	award	size	is	harmful.	To	be	sure,	if	the	
initial	bias	were	sufficiently	extreme,	we	may,	under	certain	conditions,	not	
want	 to	 reduce	 variability	 around	 the	 central	 award.	 But	 such	 a	 problem	
would	 require	 extreme	 initial	 bias,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 assume	 that	
such	 a	 bias	 exists	 ሺeven	 if,	 for	 our	 purposes,	 there	 were	 cause	 to	 assume	
some	source	of	bias	in	the	first	placeሻ.	Furthermore,	such	an	assumption	may	
be	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 position	 of	 the	 courts	 that	 reducing	 random	
variation,	 without	 more	 ሺe.g.,	 without	 causing	 biasሻ,	 is	 beneficial.	 In	 any	
event,	for	purposes	of	clarity	and	consistency	with	previous	literature,	and	to	
highlight	the	assumption	that	any	introduction	of	bias	is	harmful	to	accuracy,	
we	 defined	 the	 correct	 awards	 as	 above,	 and	 estimated	 them	 using	 the	
medians	of	the	control	group	awards.	
65.	 We	 defined	 “biased”	 conditions	 using	 the	 30th	 percentile	 to	 reflect	 very	
substantial,	but	not	entirely	unrealistic,	court	“error”	in	determining	a	set	of	
prior	awards.	 In	Leg	 II,	we	used	an	alternative	definition.	 See	 infra	Section	
III.E.	
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We	 collected	 data	 on	 nine	 covariates—age,	 sex,	 ethnicity,	 education,	
employment	 status,	 marital	 status,	 household	 income,	 residential	
community	 type,	 and	 political	 affiliation—upon	 receiving	 each	
participant’s	 award	 determination	 and	 optional	 explanation.	 We	 used	
these	data,	as	well	as	metadata	regarding	participant	enrollment	times,	to	
test	 whether	 our	 randomization	 achieved	 reasonable	 covariate	 balance	
	
66.	 We	use	“m”	to	denote	millions	and	“k”	to	denote	thousands.	
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across	 treatment	 conditions.67	 Substantial	 imbalances	 could	 prevent	 us	




we	 used	 Pearson’s	 Chi‐squared	 test,	 which	 revealed	 no	 statistically	
“significant”	 differences	 among	 the	 twenty‐two	 treatment	 groups.69	 We	
also	performed	pairwise	comparisons	to	evaluate	differences	in	frequency	
distributions	 on	 each	 covariate	 for	 each	 of	 the	 pairs	 of	
distinct	 treatment	 groups	 using	 Fisher’s	 exact	 test	 and	 the	 “Benjamini‐
Hochberg	procedure”	 to	control	 the	 false	discovery	rate	ሺFDRሻ	to	correct	
for	 multiple	 comparisons.70	 Again,	 we	 found	 no	 significant	 differences	
between	pairs	of	treatment	groups	on	any	of	the	eleven	variables	tested.	
	
67.	 We	 used	 metadata	 regarding	 participant	 enrollment	 times	 to	 construct	
variables	 reflecting	 the	 time	 of	 day	 and	 day	 of	 the	 week	 of	 participant	
enrollment	 to	 check	 for	 systematic	 differences	 in	 participants	 based	 on	
enrollment	 times	 that	 may	 influence	 overall	 covariate	 balance	 and	 to	
validate	our	assumption	that	participants	enrolled	in	the	study	randomly.	
68.	 To	 avoid	 data	 “dredging”	 and	 ensure	 that	 covariate	 balance	 would	 be	
corrected	 in	 an	 objective	 manner,	 we	 finalized	 procedures	 for	 assessing	
covariate	balance	and	for	addressing	any	imbalances	prior	to	accessing	any	
data,	 and	 we	 analyzed	 the	 covariate	 data	 in	 a	 so‐called	 secondary	 design	
phase	in	which	we	removed	all	outcome	data	and	considered	only	covariate	
data.	
69.	 We	 followed	 the	 common	 practice	 of	 combining,	 where	 sensible,	
neighboring	 levels	 of	 the	 covariate	 contingency	 table	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	
were	 five	 or	 more	 ሺexpectedሻ	 observations	 in	 each	 cell	 of	 the	 table.	 See	
generally	 William	 G.	 Cochran,	 The	 χ2	 Test	 of	 Goodness	 of	 Fit,	23	 ANNALS	
MATHEMATICAL	STAT.	315	ሺ1952ሻ.	For	example,	 for	age,	we	aggregated	 levels	
for	 ages	 above	 sixty‐one	 to	 create	 one	 “Over	 61”	 level;	 for	 ethnicity,	
participants	 who	 marked	 “American	 Indian	 or	 Alaska	 Native”	 were	
aggregated	with	participants	marking	the	value,	“Other.”	Additionally,	for	the	
covariate	 sex,	 we	 observed	 twenty	 participants	who	marked	 the	 response	
“Other”	ሺaveraging	one	or	fewer	observations	per	treatment	groupሻ.	Because	
there	was	no	clear	way	to	recode	these	observations	into	either	the	“Male”	or	
“Female”	 levels,	we	 excluded	 these	 participants	 from	 subsequent	 analyses.	
We	 then	 performed	post‐hoc	 analyses	 to	 evaluate	 any	 impact	 of	 excluding	
them	and	concluded	that	there	was	no	such	impact.	
70.	 See	Yoav	Benjamini	&	Yosi	Hochberg,	Controlling	the	False	Discovery	Rate:	A	
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The	 analysis	 of	 data	 from	 factorial	 experiments	 often	 relies	 on	 a	
generalized	 linear	model	 framework	ሺi.e.,	 analysis	of	variance	ሺANOVAሻሻ.	
However,	 as	 discussed	 in	 2K	 Factorial	 Designs,	 these	 approaches	 have	
drawbacks	 that	 can	 impede	 the	ability	 to	make	 causal	 conclusions	about	
the	 experimental	 factors.71	 We	 therefore	 based	 our	 analyses	 and	
estimation	of	causal	effects	on	the	potential	outcomes	framework	of	Jerzy	
Neyman,72	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Rubin	 Causal	 Model	 ሺRCMሻ.73	 We	
followed	 the	 basic	 notation	 and	 philosophy	 of	 estimation	 in	 2K	 Factorial	




across	 aggregations	 of	 treatment	 groups	 corresponding	 to	 sixty	 effects	 of	
interest	defined	in	our	primary	analysis	and	found	suitable	balance	for	each	
aggregation.	
71.	 For	 example,	 one	 drawback	 of	 the	 linear	 model	 framework	 is	 the	
requirement	 that	 the	 causal	 estimands	 be	 defined	 as	 parameters	 of	 the	
probability	 distribution	 of	 the	 observed	 response.	 To	 the	 contrary,	 our	
results	do	not	 rely	on	distributional	assumptions.	 See	2K	Factorial	Designs,	
supra	note	54.	
72.	 See	 Jerzy	 Splawa‐Neyman,	 Próba	 uzasadnienia	 zastosowań	 rachunku	
prawdopodobieństwa	 do	 doświadczeń	 polowych	 ሾOn	 the	 Application	 of	




74.	 Under	 the	 RCM,	 each	 unit	 ሺi.e.,	 each	 participantሻ	 in	 this	 experiment	 has	
twenty‐two	 “potential	 outcomes,”	 one	 for	 each	 possible	 treatment	
combination.	For	example,	 a	participant	may	have	awarded	$4	million	had	
he	 been	 randomized	 to	 the	 punitive	 damages	 scenario	 of	 the	 control	
condition,	 $2	 million	 had	 he	 been	 randomized	 to	 the	 unbiased,	 low‐
variability,	average,	punitive	damages	treatment	condition,	and	so	on	and	so	
forth	 for	all	 twenty‐two	possible	 treatment	combinations.	The	RCM	 frames	
causal	 inference	 as	 a	missing‐data	 problem:	 because	we	 can	 observe	 only	
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Using	this	framework,	we	defined	“estimands”	ሺquantities	of	interestሻ	













magnitude	 of	 resulting	 award	 values,	 where	 accuracy	 is	 defined	 as	 the	
proximity	 of	 the	 awards	 to	 the	 “correct”	 award	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 bias	 and	
variance.	These	objectives	motivated	our	choice	of	estimands.	We	used	 the	
mean	 of	 the	 logarithm‐transformed	 data	 to	 define	 magnitude,	 the	
interquartile	 range	 ሺIQRሻ	 ሺi.e.,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 75th	 percentile	
and	 the	 25th	 percentileሻ,	 to	 define	 spread,	 and	 the	 mean	 squared	 error	
ሺequal	 to	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 variance	 and	 the	 squared	 bias	 relative	 to	 the	
“correct”	 awardሻ	 to	 define	 error.	 An	 estimand	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 certain	
variable	on	spread,	 for	example,	 can	 therefore	be	defined	as	 the	difference	
between	 the	 IQR	 ሺin	 terms	 of	 potential	 outcomesሻ	 associated	 with	 one	
comparison	group	and	that	of	another	comparison	group—for	example,	the	
IQR	 associated	with	 the	 unbiased	 punitive	 damages	 group	 and	 that	 of	 the	
biased	 punitive	 damages	 group.	 A	 corresponding	 estimator	 can	 then	 be	
defined	 using	 the	 observed	 data.	 Using	 the	 factorial‐effect	 estimators	 we	
estimated	 an	 effect	 by	 computing	 the	 values	 of	 accuracy,	 spread,	 and	
magnitude	 for	 each	of	 the	 treatment	 combinations	 involving	 the	 factor	 ሺor	
combination	of	factorsሻ	of	interest,	and	then	separately	averaging	over	each	
of	 the	 treatment	 combinations	 with	 the	 same	 level	 of	 the	 factor	 ሺor	
combination	 of	 factorsሻ.	 For	 example,	 for	 the	 main	 effect	 of	 bias	 on	
magnitude	 within	 the	 pain	 and	 suffering	 scenario,	 we:	 1ሻ	 calculated	 the	
magnitude	 of	 award	 amounts	 separately	 for	 each	 of	 the	 ten	 treatment	
combinations	receiving	either	biased	or	unbiased	prior	award	information	in	
the	pain	and	suffering	scenario	using	the	mean	of	the	logarithm‐transformed	
values;	 2ሻ	 averaged	 the	 values	 from	 step	 ሺ1ሻ	 across	 the	 five	 treatment	
combinations	 receiving	 biased	 information,	 and	 separately	 averaged	 the	
values	 from	 step	 ሺ1ሻ	 across	 the	 five	 treatment	 combinations	 receiving	
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We	 were	 interested	 in	 testing	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 true	
difference	 between	 comparison	 groups	 is	 zero.	 Once	 we	 calculated	 the	
estimates	of	factorial	effects	using	observed	data,	we	sought	to	understand	
the	 “statistical	 significance”	 of	 the	 estimated	 effects,	 which	 can	 be	
interpreted	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 how	 unlikely	 the	 observed	 differences	
between	treatment	groups	would	be	under	certain	hypothesized	effects.76	
To	do	 this,	we	used	 the	Fisherian	approach77	and	applied	 randomization	
tests	 to	 evaluate	 “Fisher’s	 sharp	 null	 hypothesis”	 of	 “no	 unit‐level	
treatment	effects.”	We	applied	this	approach	to	approximate	“Fisher	exact	
p‐values”	 for	each	hypothesis	and	 to	generate	95%	“Fisher	 intervals”	 for	
certain	 effects	 of	 interest.78	 All	 p‐values	 were	 adjusted	 for	 multiple	
comparisons	 using	 the	 Benjamini‐Hochberg	 procedure	 to	 control	 the	
	
76.	 Rubin,	supra	note	54.	
77.	 Note	 that	 the	RCM	allows	such	 inference	using	the	Neymanian	perspective,	
Fisherian	 perspective,	 or	 the	 Bayesian	 perspective.	 See	 Donald	 B.	 Rubin,	
Bayesian	Inference	for	Causal	Effects:	The	Role	of	Randomization,	6	ANNALS	
STAT.	 34	 ሺ1978ሻ.	 Because	 the	 estimator	 for	 capturing,	 for	 example,	 the	
spread	 of	 award	 values	 is	 not	 an	 unbiased	 estimator	 of	 its	 corresponding	
estimand,	 and	 for	other	 reasons,	we	decided	not	 to	use	Neyman’s	method.	
One	 of	 the	 major	 advantages	 of	 the	 Fisherian	 approach	 to	 inference,	 as	
opposed	to	a	model‐based	or	Bayesian	approach,	is	that	it	does	not	require	
any	 assumptions	 about	 the	 underlying	 distribution	 of	 the	 data.	 Thus,	
randomization	 tests	 can	 be	 constructed	 and	 applied	 for	 any	 test	 statistic,	
regardless	whether	its	distribution	is	known.	
78.	 Specifically,	 for	 each	 effect	 of	 interest,	 we	 assumed	 the	 “sharp	 null”	
hypothesis	 of	 “no	 unit‐level	 treatment	 effect”	 to	 impute	 missing	 potential	
outcomes	for	each	participant.	We	then	generated	a	sample	of	Nsimൌ250,000	
possible	randomizations	of	the	N	participants.	See	generally	GUIDO	W.	IMBENS	
&	 DONALD	 B.	 RUBIN,	 CAUSAL	 INFERENCE	 FOR	 STATISTICS,	 SOCIAL,	 AND	 BIOMEDICAL	
SCIENCES	 ሺ2015ሻ.	 For	 each	 of	 these	 250,000	 possible	 randomizations,	 we	
recomputed	 the	 value	 of	 the	 test	 statistic	 under	 the	 ሺhypotheticalሻ	
randomization.	 The	 resulting	 distribution	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 the	
“randomization	 distribution”	 of	 the	 test	 statistic.	 We	 approximated	 Fisher	
exact	 p‐values	 for	 each	 hypothesis	 ሺto	 compute	 statistical	 significanceሻ	 by	
calculating	 the	 proportion	 of	 values	 in	 the	 randomization	 distribution	 that	
were	equal	to	or	more	extreme	than	the	observed	test	statistic.	For	certain	
effects,	 we	 generated	 95%	 Fisher	 intervals	 by	 calculating	 a	 sequence	 of	
ሺunadjustedሻ	 p‐values	 corresponding	 to	 a	 null	 hypothesis	 other	 than	 the	
hypothesis	of	 “zero	 treatment	effect,”	 and	 then	 identified	 the	hypothesized	
values	that	result	in	p‐values	equal	to	or	larger	than	0.05.	For	all	estimates,	
we	assumed	a	constant	additive	treatment	effect.	
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FDR.79	After	adjustment,	we	considered	p‐values	of	less	than	αൌ0.05	to	be	
statistically	 significant.	 “Significance”	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 substantial	








Leg	 I	 involved	prior‐award	 information	 that	was	heavily	 right‐skewed	 in	
distribution,	which	may	have	introduced	certain	effects.	Therefore,	in	Leg	
II,	 we	 aimed	 to	 test	 1ሻ	 the	 effects	 of	 unbiased	 prior‐award	 information	
when	 prior	 awards	 were	 approximately	 symmetric	 rather	 than	 right‐
skewed;	 and	 2ሻ	 the	 effects	 of	 upwardly	 biased	 prior‐award	 information	
ሺwith	 minimal	 or	 no	 skewሻ.	We	 also	 sought	 to	 test	 the	 effects	 of	 prior‐
award	 information	 using	 alternative	 definitions	 of	 accuracy,	 spread,	 and	
magnitude.	
We	generally	applied	 the	design	of	Leg	 I	 to	Leg	 II,81	only	altering	 the	
numerical	values	provided	to	participants.	Also,	Leg	II,	which	used	only	the	
list	 form	 for	 prior‐award	 information,	 involved	 only	 ten	 treatment	
conditions	 and	 a	 significantly	 reduced	 sample	 size.	 As	 in	 Leg	 I,	 we	
determined	the	numerical	values	of	prior	awards	using	a	pilot	study	that	
substantively	 replicated	 the	 control	 groups.	 In	 Leg	 II,	 we	 constructed	
approximately	 symmetric	 distributions	 around	 the	medians	 observed	 in	
	
79.	 See	Benjamini	&	Hochberg,	 supra	 note	 70;	Maria	T.	 Kimel	 et	 al.,	 The	 False	
Discovery	 Rate	 for	 Multiple	 Testing	 in	 Factorial	 Experiments,	 50	
TECHNOMETRICS	32	ሺ2012ሻ.	Due	to	having	a	large	number	of	tests,	we	divided	




80.	 Note	 that,	 throughout	 the	 study,	we	made	 the	 “stable	unit	 treatment	value	
assumption”	 ሺSUTVAሻ.	 This	means	 1ሻ	 that	 the	 potential	 outcome	 of	 a	 unit	
depends	 only	 on	 its	 own	 assignment,	 and	 not	 on	 the	 assignments	 of	 other	
units,	 and	2ሻ	 that	 there	are	no	 “hidden	versions”	of	 treatment.	2K	Factorial	
Designs,	supra	note	54,	at	730.	We	believe	this	was	justified.	
81.	 This	 includes	 procedures	 for	 assessing	 covariate	 balance,	 which	 our	
randomization	achieved.	
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the	pilot	study	ሺ$500,000	for	punitive	damages	and	$2	million	for	pain	and	
sufferingሻ;	 and	 we	 multiplied	 the	 unbiased	 prior‐award	 values	 by	



















Importantly,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 purposes	 stated	 above,	 Leg	 II	 was	
intended	to	test	certain	limits	of	prior‐award	information	in	improving	the	
accuracy	 of	 damage	 awards.	 We	 used,	 for	 example,	 relatively	 extreme	
values	in	the	biased	conditions	and	smaller	differences	between	the	high‐
variability	 and	 low‐variability	 conditions.	 We	 also	 used	 a	 substantially	
smaller	sample	size.	Therefore,	as	we	noted	up	front	in	our	Leg	II	design,	





effect.82	 Our	 general	 approach	 to	 interpreting	 the	 data	 was	 as	 follows:	
First,	we	examined	the	comparison	that	most	directly	informs	an	effect	of	




outcome	 data	 prior	 to	 completing	 the	 design	 phase	 of	 each	 leg	 of	 the	
experiment,	respectively.	
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ሺ2ሻ,	we	generally	 interpreted	 the	data	as	strongly	evidencing	an	effect.	 If	
we	found	support	for	the	effect	in	step	ሺ1ሻ,	but	an	absence	of	evidence	for	
the	effect	 in	step	ሺ2ሻ,	we	generally	 interpreted	 the	data	as	evidencing	an	
effect,	 unless	 there	 was	 a	 particular	 reason	 to	 believe	 otherwise.	 If	 we	
found	support	for	the	effect	in	step	ሺ1ሻ	but	evidence	against	it	in	step	ሺ2ሻ,	
we	examined	the	 inconsistency	 that	arose	 in	step	ሺ2ሻ.	 If	our	examination	
revealed	a	straightforward	explanation	that	defused	the	inconsistency,	we	
interpreted	 the	 data	 as	 evidencing	 an	 effect	 and	 sought	 to	 confirm	 the	
effect	 in	 Leg	 II.	 If	 the	 examination	 failed	 to	 reveal	 a	 straightforward	
explanation,	we	 interpreted	 the	data	 as	not	 evidencing	 an	 effect,	 and	we	
examined	the	results	for	an	alternative	explanation.	
A.	 The	Data	
There	 are	 approximately	 240‐250	 observations	 for	 each	 treatment	
level.83	To	address	extreme	outliers,	we	“winsorized”	the	data	at	the	99th	
percentile	for	our	primary	analysis	and	analyzed	the	effects	of	prior‐award	
information	on	outliers—defined	as	 awards	above	 the	99th	percentile	 in	
each	 scenario—separately.	 This	 means	 that	 any	 awards	 above	 the	 99th	
percentile—$50	million	 for	 punitive	 damages	 and	 $100	million	 for	 pain	
and	suffering—were	recoded	to	the	award	value	of	the	99th	percentile.84	




originated	 from	 registered	 Mechanical	 Turk	 users	 who	 met	 our	 inclusion	




participants,	 and	 because	 there	 was	 no	 evidence	 suggesting	 any	 resulting	
systematic	 distortion,	 we	 excluded	 these	 participants	 without	 applying	






84.	 Similarly,	 in	 Leg	 II,	 we	 winsorized	 the	 data	 at	 the	 99th	 percentile	 ሺ$50	
million	 and	 $174.6	 million	 for	 punitive	 damages	 and	 pain	 and	 suffering,	
respectivelyሻ.	
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that	 are	dominated	by	 chance	 rather	 than	 true	effects.85	Furthermore,	 to	
ensure	 the	 robustness	 of	 our	 findings,	 we	 also	 tested	 them	 under	
alternative	winsorization	thresholds.	We	report	the	corresponding	results	
below.	
Thus,	 unless	 stated	 otherwise,	 the	 results	 we	 report	 below	 reflect	
datasets	winsorized	at	the	99th	percentile.	In	certain	instances,	we	report	
results	from	alternative	winsorization	schemes	for	illustrative	purposes	or	





85.	 Winsorizing	 had	 minimal	 consequences	 for	 our	 results	 in	 the	 punitive	
damages	scenario	ሺsince	outliers	in	that	scenario	are	less	extreme	in	size	and	
effectሻ	 but	 was	 important	 to	 prevent	 spurious	 results	 in	 the	 pain	 and	
suffering	 scenario	 ሺalthough	 ultimately	 it	 was	 not	 dramatically	
consequential	for	our	conclusionsሻ.	Note	that	our	original	design	in	Leg	I	did	
not	include	a	winsorization	scheme	due	to	our	sensitivity	to	the	importance	
of	outliers	 in	 this	 study,	but	due	 to	a	 few	extreme	outliers,	 it	became	clear	
that	not	using	such	a	method	would	 lead	 to	spurious	results.	We	 therefore	















The	 data	 provide	 strong	 evidence	 that	 prior‐award	 information	
reduces	 error	 and	 improves	 accuracy.	 In	 both	 levels	 of	 scenario,	 and	
across	all	levels	of	bias	and	variability,	and	their	interactions,	prior‐award	
information	 had	 a	 significant	 negative	 effect	 on	 error	 and	 significant	
positive	effect	on	accuracy,	which	we	measured	using	mean	squared	error	
	
86.		 For	 descriptive	 purposes,	 we	 exclude	 from	 this	 summary	 of	 raw	 pain	 and	















Sample	Size	 2751	 2751	 2704	 2707	
Mean	
ሺmillionsሻ	
$18.3	 $2.3	 $23.8	 $6.7	
Median	
ሺmillionsሻ	
$0.5	 $0.5	 $3.0	 $3.0	
SD	
ሺmillionsሻ	
$397.3	 $6.4	 $396.0	 $14.0	
IQR	
ሺmillionsሻ	














Sample	Size	 1262	 1262	 1259	 1259	
Mean	
ሺmillionsሻ	
$13.1	 $2.35	 $23.8	 $8.5	
Median	
ሺmillionsሻ	
$1.0	 $1.0	 $4.0	 $4.0	
SD	
ሺmillionsሻ	
$286.6	 $6.2	 $255.2	 $20.3	
IQR	
ሺmillionsሻ	
$1.4	 $1.4	 $6.4	 $6.4	
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ሺMSEሻ,	 a	 combination	 of	 variance	 and	 bias.	 Figure	 1	 illustrates	 the	
approximate	 randomization	distributions	 and	observed	 test	 statistics	 for	
the	 hypothesis	 tests	 of	 “no	 treatment	 effect”	 in	 each	 scenario;	 Figures	 2	
and	3	summarize	the	effects	on	error	ሺthe	inverse	of	accuracyሻ	with	95%	
Fisher	intervals	and	levels	of	significance.	Note	that,	throughout	this	Part,	





Figure	 1‐	 Randomization	 Distributions.	 Randomization	 distributions	












		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Figure	2	–	Effects	on	Error.	Point	and	interval	estimates	for	difference	
in	mean	squared	error	ሺMSEሻ	ሺin	trillionsሻ	for	each	treatment	condition	for	
punitive	 damages	 ሺleftሻ	 and	 pain	 and	 suffering	 ሺrightሻ	 vs.	 control	 ሺ$146	
and	 $492,	 respectivelyሻ.	 Stars	 indicate	 statistical	 significance	 ሺafter	
correction	 for	 multiple	 comparisonsሻ	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 MSE	 between	
each	treatment	condition	and	control.	
	Figure	3	 –	 Effects	 on	Error.	 Observed	mean	 squared	 error	 ሺMSEሻ	 ሺin	
trillionsሻ	for	different	treatment	combinations	for	punitive	damages	ሺleftሻ	
and	pain	and	suffering	 ሺrightሻ.	Dotted	 lines	at	$146	and	$492	show	MSE	




As	 discussed	 above,	 prior‐award	 information	may	 introduce	 error	 in	
the	 form	 of	 distortion,	 or	 bias,	 but	 also	 reduce	 error	 by	 reducing	 the	
dispersion	of	awards.	We	discuss	effects	on	spread	and	magnitude	below.	
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The	results	above	show,	however,	that	any	distortionary	effects	on	the	size	
of	 awards	 are	 dominated	 ሺin	 terms	of	 errorሻ	 by	 the	 beneficial	 effects	 on	
dispersion.	In	particular,	prior‐award	information	caused	an	improvement	
in	accuracy	across	all	 levels	of	bias,	 variability,	 and	 form—effects	 largely	
observed	at	the	 .001	level	ሺand	all	but	one	at	the	 .01	levelሻ.	Furthermore,	
we	observed	similar	 results	under	 secondary	winsorization	schemes	and	
definitions	 of	 accuracy.	 For	 example,	 to	 confirm	 that	 our	 results	 held	
without	 the	 influence	 of	 more‐extreme	 values,	 we	 examined	 four	
important	 effects	 using	 data	 winsorized	 at	 the	 90th	 percentile—i.e.,	 $5	
million	for	punitive	damages	and	$10	million	for	pain	and	suffering.	Using	
these	data,	we	again	observed	significant	positive	effects	on	accuracy,	all	at	
the	 .001	 level.	 Similarly,	 we	 observed	 positive	 effects	 on	 accuracy	 using	
mean	 absolute	 error	 ሺMAEሻ	 rather	 than	 MSE	 to	 define	 accuracy.	 Our	
results	for	these	effects	are	summarized	in	Figures	4‐6.	
	
	Figure	 4	 ‐	 Effects	 on	 Error	When	Winsorizing	 at	 the	 90th	 Percentile.	
Point	estimates	and	95%	Fisher	 intervals	 for	difference	 in	mean	squared	
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Figure	 5	 ‐	 Effects	 on	 Error	When	Winsorizing	 at	 the	 90th	 Percentile.	
Observed	 mean	 squared	 error	 ሺMSEሻ	 ሺin	 trillionsሻ	 for	 unbiased	 low‐
variability	 and	 biased	 low‐variability	 conditions	 for	 punitive	 damages	
ሺleftሻ	 and	 pain	 and	 suffering	 ሺrightሻ	 when	 winsorizing	 at	 the	 90th	
percentile	in	each	scenario.	Dotted	lines	show	MSE	for	control	groups,	and	
stars	 indicate	 statistical	 significance	 ሺafter	 correction	 for	 multiple	






ሺleftሻ	 and	 pain	 and	 suffering	 ሺrightሻ	 when	 winsorizing	 at	 the	 90th	
percentile	in	each	scenario.	Dotted	lines	show	MAE	for	control	groups,	and	
stars	 indicate	 statistical	 significance	 ሺafter	 correction	 for	 multiple	
comparisonsሻ	of	difference	 in	MAE	between	each	 treatment	 combination	
and	control.	
	





7ሻ.	Additionally,	 aside	 from	 two	benign	exceptions,	 all	 tests	using	a	90th	
percentile	 winsorization	 scheme	 or	 MAE	 for	 the	 definition	 of	 accuracy	
resulted	in	significant	positive	effects	on	accuracy.88	
	Figure	 7	 –	 Leg	 II	 Effects	 on	 Error.	 Point	 and	 interval	 estimates	 for	
difference	 in	mean	squared	error	ሺMSEሻ	ሺin	trillionsሻ	vs.	control	 for	each	
treatment	 condition	 for	 punitive	 damages	 ሺleftሻ	 and	 pain	 and	 suffering	
ሺrightሻ	in	Leg	II.	
	
88.	 Throughout	 this	 Part,	 aside	 from	a	 few	 comments,	we	do	not	 focus	 on	 the	
effects	of	form	on	the	various	outcome	variables.	The	most	important	finding	
with	 respect	 to	 form	 is	 that	 our	 results	 are	 generally	 not	 sensitive	 to	 the	
particular	form	of	the	prior‐award	information,	and	specifically,	to	whether	
we	provided	jurors	with	prior‐award	information	in	the	form	of	an	average,	
range,	 or	 list.	 Most	 significantly,	 we	 found	 that	 prior‐award	 information	
improves	accuracy	 regardless	of	 the	 level	of	 form.	More	broadly,	we	 found	
that	form	generally	did	not	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	outcome	variables	
studied.	This	does	not	 imply	that	prior‐award	form	necessarily	would	have	
no	 significant	 impact	 on	 jury	 determinations.	 See	 generally	 supra	 note	 53;	
Saks	 et	 al.,	 supra	 note	 22.	 Rather,	 we	 simply	 did	 not	 detect	 a	 significant	
impact	 in	 our	 study.	 It	 is	 possible,	 for	 example,	 that	 such	 effects	 were	
rendered	 undetectable	 in	 our	 study	 by	 other	 sources	 of	 variability.	
Nevertheless,	our	findings	with	respect	to	form	arguably	suggest	that	 if	 the	
development	 of	 one	 form	 of	 prior‐award	 information	 involves	 lower	 costs	
than	others,	it	could	be	cost‐effective	to	present	prior‐award	information	to	
a	 jury	 in	 this	 form,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 similar	 levels	 of	 effectiveness	 detected	
across	various	forms.	However,	further	research	regarding	prior‐award	form	
would	be	valuable,	and	necessary	to	draw	a	firm	conclusion	in	this	regard.	








in	 variance.	 However,	 we	 separately	 tested	 the	 effect	 of	 prior‐award	
information	 on	 spread,	 which	 we	 defined	 using	 the	 IQR	 rather	 than	
variance.	Understanding	the	effect	of	prior‐award	 information	on	spread,	
in	 addition	 to	 its	 effect	 on	 accuracy,	 permits	 a	 more	 nuanced	
understanding	of	the	data.	
The	IQR	is,	in	a	sense,	less	sensitive	to	differences	in	random	variation.	
For	 example,	 changing	 a	 value	 at	 the	 95th	 percentile	 from	 $1	million	 to	
$50	 million	 would	 not	 affect	 spread.	 But	 spread	 provides	 specific	
information—the	difference	between	the	75th	and	25th	percentiles—that	
may	be	obscured	in	other	measures	of	dispersion.	
The	 data	 provide	 strong	 evidence	 that	 prior‐award	 information	
reduces	 spread.	 In	 the	 punitive	 damages	 scenario,	 our	 comparison	 of	 all	
active	treatment	conditions	ሺcombinedሻ	to	the	control	condition	indicated	
that,	 overall,	 prior‐award	 information	 caused	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	
spread	 ሺp൏0.001***ሻ.	 Furthermore,	 we	 found	 that	 both	 unbiased	 prior‐
award	information	and	biased	prior‐award	information	caused	a	reduction	
in	spread	ሺpൌ0.02*	for	unbiased	and	p൏0.001***	for	biasedሻ.89	
In	 several	 tests,	 particularly	 in	 the	 pain	 and	 suffering	 scenario,	 we	
detected	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 spread.	 This	 result	 was	 not	 very	
surprising,	 however,	 because	 the	 range	 of	 the	 prior	 awards—and	
particularly	 the	 high‐variability	 prior	 awards—was	 frequently	
substantially	 larger	 than	 the	 control	 group	 IQR.90	 This	 caused	 spread	 to	
	
89.	 Note	 that	 the	 average	 level	 of	 form	 tended	 to	 have	 a	 greater	 downward	
impact	 on	 spread	 relative	 to	 the	 other	 levels	 of	 form.	 This	 may	 be	
interpreted	 as	 resulting	 from	 the	 participants’	 perception	 that	 there	 is	 no	
variability	 in	 the	 prior‐awards,	 since	 they	 were	 provided	 only	 a	 single	
number.	 Alternatively,	 the	 participants	 could	 have	 interpreted	 the	 average	
form	 as	 providing	 less	 information	 and	 therefore	 “deserving	 of”	 less	
influence.	Participants	 simply	did	not	know	whether	 the	average	 reflected,	




the	 range	 of	 values	 of	 unbiased	 high‐variability	 prior	 awards	 are	 the	 15th	




overall	 reduction	 in	 dispersion,	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	 effects	 of	 unbiased	
prior‐award	 information	 on	 accuracy.91	 Effects	 on	 spread,	 with	 Fisher	
intervals	and	levels	of	significance,	are	summarized	in	Figure	8.	
		 Figure	8	–	Effects	on	Spread.	Point	estimates	and	95%	Fisher	intervals	




and	 85th	 percentiles,	 substantially	 wider	 than	 the	 IQR’s	 25th	 and	 75th	
percentiles;	second,	there	was	greater	dispersion	in	the	pilot	study	data	than	
in	 the	 control	 group	 data,	 caused	 by	 “choppiness”	 in	 the	 data	 or	 sampling	
variation.	 In	Leg	 II,	we	addressed	 this	 issue	by	 testing	 the	effect	on	spread	
using	narrower	prior‐award	distributions.	See	infra	Figure	9.	
91.	 For	 example,	 unbiased	 high‐variability	 and	 unbiased	 low‐variability	 prior	
awards	 in	 the	 pain	 and	 suffering	 scenario	 ranged	 from	 $200,000	 to	 $15	
million	and	from	$1.12	million	to	$4.7	million,	respectively,	compared	to	the	
25th	 and	 75th	 percentiles	 of	 the	 pain	 and	 suffering	 control	 group	 awards,	
which	 were	 $50,000	 and	 $5	 million,	 respectively.	 This	 explanation	 is	
corroborated	 by	 our	 results	 in	 the	 punitive	 damages	 scenario,	 where,	
although	spread	decreased	in	response	to	unbiased	and	biased	prior‐award	
information	 ሺseparately	 and	 combinedሻ,	 and	 decreased	 in	 response	 to	
unbiased	 low‐variability,	 biased	 low‐variability,	 and	 biased	 high‐variability	
prior‐award	 information,	 it	 increased	 in	 response	 to	 unbiased	 high‐
variability	prior‐award	information.	This	makes	sense,	because,	as	with	the	
pain	 and	 suffering	 scenario,	 unbiased	 high‐variability	 prior	 awards	 ranged	
from	$10,000	to	$10	million,	a	range	far	greater	than	the	control	group	25th	
and	75th	percentiles	ሺ$100,000	and	$3	million,	respectivelyሻ.	Compare	this	
to	 the	 unbiased	 low‐variability	 prior	 awards,	 which	 ranged	 only	 from	
$500,000	to	$1	million,	well	within	the	range	of	control	group	25th	and	75th	
percentiles.	This	 interpretation	 is	confirmed	by	our	results	 in	Leg	 II,	which	
used	 narrower	 prior‐award	 distributions	 and	 resulted	 in	 significant	
reductions	in	spread	across	the	board.	
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To	confirm	our	 interpretation,	we	 first	 tested	effects	on	spread	using	
alternative	 winsorization	 thresholds	 and	 measures	 of	 dispersion.	
Specifically,	we	tested	the	effects	of	unbiased	prior‐award	information	on	
the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 awards	 using	 data	 winsorized	 at	 the	 90th	
percentile.	These	 tests	provide	substantial	support	 for	our	 interpretation	
above.	 Specifically,	 in	 both	 levels	 of	 scenario,	 unbiased	 prior‐award	
information	 reduced	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 awards	 ሺp൏0.001***	 for	
punitive	 damages	 and	 for	 pain	 and	 sufferingሻ.	 Further,	 in	 both	 levels	 of	
scenario,	 unbiased	 low‐variability	 prior‐award	 information	 reduced	 the	
standard	 deviation	 of	 awards	 ሺp൏0.001***	 for	 punitive	 damages	 and	 for	




Leg	 II,	 which	 involved	 substantially	 narrower	 distributions	 of	 prior	
awards,	 across	 all	 levels	 of	 scenario,	 variability,	 and	 bias,	 prior‐award	
information	 reduced	 spread	 ሺalmost	 always	 at	 the	 .001	 levelሻ	 using	 our	
standard	 definition	 of	 spread	 ሺIQRሻ	 and	 our	 standard	 winsorization	
threshold	ሺ99th	percentileሻ.92	The	Leg	II	effects	on	spread	are	illustrated	in	
Figure	9.	
	Figure	 9	 –	 Leg	 II	 Effects	 on	 Spread.	 Point	 estimates	 and	 95%	 Fisher	




negative	 but	 non‐significant	 effects,	 defining	 spread	 using	 variance	 and	
winsorizing	 at	 the	 99th	 percentile	 or	 the	 90th	 percentile	 resulted	 in	
significant	reductions	in	spread	across	all	levels	of	scenario,	variability,	and	
bias.	
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treatment	 condition	 for	 punitive	 damages	 ሺleftሻ	 and	 pain	 and	 suffering	
ሺrightሻ	in	Leg	II.	
D.	 Effect	on	Magnitude	
The	 effect	 of	 prior‐award	 information	 on	 magnitude	 is	 less	
straightforward	 than	 its	 effects	 on	 accuracy	 and	 spread.	 Using	 our	
standard	 definition	 of	magnitude,	 the	mean	 of	 the	 log‐transformed	 data,	
we	 found	 that	 unbiased	 prior‐award	 information	 generally	 caused	 a	
positive	effect	on	magnitude	for	all	levels	of	scenario,	variability,	and	form.	
However,	using	 the	median	 to	define	magnitude,	we	 found	no	effect,	and	
using	 the	 mean	 to	 define	 magnitude,	 we	 found	 no	 effect	 or	 a	 negative	
effect.	
We	can	explain	these	disparities	by	considering	the	differences	among	
the	 various	 measures.	 The	 mean	 of	 the	 log‐transformed	 data	 is	 a	
commonly	 used	 measure	 for	 testing	 magnitude	 with	 right‐skewed	 data.	
The	 reason	 that	 it	 is	 popular	 for	 right‐skewed	 data	 is	 that	 it	 “pulls	 in”	
extreme	values	more	than	it	“pulls	in”	moderate	values.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	 median,	 which	 accounts	 only	 for	 differences	 in	 order,	 is	 not	 at	 all	
affected	by	 the	 skew;	and	 the	mean,	which	 is	 sensitive	 to	 size,	 is	heavily	
influenced	 by	 extreme	 values.	We	 can	 therefore	 understand	 the	 data	 as	
follows:	unbiased	prior‐award	information	had	no	significant	effect	on	the	
size	of	awards,	in	the	sense	that	the	central	award—the	median—was	not	
affected.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 punitive	 damages	 scenario,	 the	 median	 of	
awards	 in	 the	 control	 condition	 is	 equal	 to	 the	 median	 of	 awards	 in	
unbiased	 conditions,	 $1	 million.	 This	 result	 supports	 the	 argument	 that	
providing	 jurors	 with	 unbiased	 prior‐award	 information	 reduces	 the	
dispersion	 of	 awards	 while	 distorting	 award	 size	 ሺmeasured	 using	 the	
medianሻ	 minimally	 or	 not	 at	 all.	 Furthermore,	 in	 line	 with	 our	
expectations,	 unbiased	 prior‐award	 information	 had	 no	 effect	 or	 a	
negative	 effect	 on	 award	 size	 when	 measured	 using	 the	 mean,	 thus	
reflecting	more	extreme	but	non‐outlier	awards	ሺwhen	winsorizing	at	the	
99th	percentileሻ	or	reflecting	all	outlier	and	non‐outlier	awards	ሺwhen	not	
winsorizingሻ.93	 This	 interpretation	was	 corroborated	 by	 our	 exploratory	
	
93.	 Zero	 and	 negative	 effects	 are	 in	 line	 with	 our	 expectations	when	 defining	
magnitude	 using	 the	 mean.	 Because	 the	 distribution	 of	 award	
determinations	 is	 heavily	 right‐skewed	 ሺwhether	 winsorizing	 at	 the	 99th	
percentile	or	notሻ,	we	would	expect	that	a	reduction	in	dispersion	ሺincluding,	
for	 example,	 a	 reduction	 in	 extreme	 valuesሻ	 would	 also	 have	 a	 negative	
impact	on	the	mean	award.	
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non‐extreme	 values	 more	 heavily	 than	 more	 extreme	 ሺbut	 non‐outlierሻ	
values.	
We	 confirmed	 our	 findings	 and	 interpretation	 using	 Leg	 II	 of	 the	
experiment,	where	we	observed	similar	effects—that	is,	positive	effects	or	
no	effects	on	magnitude	using	 the	mean	of	 the	 log‐transformed	data	and	
no	effects	or	negative	effects	using	the	median	or	mean	of	the	ሺunloggedሻ	
data.95	We	summarize	the	effects	of	unbiased	prior‐award	information	on	
magnitude	 ሺbased	 on	 winsorization	 at	 the	 99th	 percentile	 unless	 stated	
otherwiseሻ	using	various	definitions	in	Table	E	below.	






















0	 0	 Negative	 Negative	 Positive	 0	 Negative	 Negative	
	
Based	 on	 our	 results	 in	 Table	 E,	 the	 effect	 of	 unbiased	 prior‐award	
information	on	magnitude	is	highly	sensitive	to	the	measure	used	to	define	








96.	 For	comparative	purposes,	Leg	 II	 results	 in	Table	E	are	generally	 listed	 for	
winsorization	 at	 the	99th	percentile.	 It	 is	 important	 to	note,	 however,	 that	
using	 the	 mean	 of	 the	 log‐transformed	 data	 and	 winsorizing	 at	 the	 95th	
percentile	ሺa	standard	definition	for	magnitude	in	Leg	IIሻ	results	in	positive	
effects	for	punitive	damages	and	pain	and	suffering.	






unbiased	 conditions,	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 bias.	 That	 is,	 for	 all	 levels	 of	
scenario	and	variability,	and	in	both	Leg	I	and	Leg	II,	downward	bias	had	a	




on	 the	 impact	 of	 prior‐award	 information.	 The	 data	 indicate	 that	 low‐





information98	 and	 thus	 has	 greater	 influence	 on	 award	 determinations.	
This	 “influence”	 translates	 to	 greater	 impacts	 on	 spread	 and	magnitude.	
Consistent	 with	 this	 model,	 for	 unbiased	 prior‐award	 information,	
variability	 had	no	 significant	 effect	 on	magnitude	 ሺsince	 the	prior‐award	
information	 was	 unbiasedሻ	 but	 low‐variability	 prior‐award	 information	
had	 a	 significantly	 greater	 impact	 ሺnegative	 impactሻ	 on	 spread	 than	 did	
high‐variability	 prior‐award	 information.	 That	 is,	 relative	 to	 unbiased	
high‐variability	 prior‐award	 information,	 unbiased	 low‐variability	 prior‐
award	information	had	no	significant	effect	on	magnitude	and	a	significant	
negative	effect	on	spread	ሺp൏0.001***	for	punitive	damages	and	for	pain	
and	 sufferingሻ.	Moreover,	 biased	 low‐variability	prior‐award	 information	
had	a	significantly	greater	impact	on	both	magnitude	and	spread	than	did	
biased	high‐variability	prior‐award	information.	In	other	words,	relative	to	
biased	 high‐variability	 prior‐award	 information,	 biased	 low‐variability	














	 	 Punitive	Damages	 Pain	and	Suffering	








Spread	 ‐$4,397,500	 0.000***	 ‐$8,000,000	 0.000***	






Spread	 ‐$727,500	 0.004**	 ‐$4,112,500	 0.000***	
Magnitude	 ‐0.67	 0.000***	 ‐0.52	 0.000***	
	
Note	 that	 a	 possible	 argument	 against	 this	 interpretation	 is	 that	 the	
results	 observed	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 effect	 of	 high	 variability	 on	
spread	 rather	 than	 the	 effect	 of	 low	 variability	 on	 the	 influence	 of	 the	
prior‐award	 information.	 Specifically,	 as	 suggested	 above,	 it	 is	 possible	
that	 high‐variability	 prior‐award	 information	 had	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	
spread,	 since	 the	 range	 of	 the	 high‐variability	 prior	 awards	was	 greater	
than	 the	 IQR	 of	 awards.	 Arguably,	 therefore,	 the	 observed	 effect	 here	
results	 only	 from	 removing	 the	 upward	 effect	 on	 spread	 caused	 by	 this	





that	biased	 low‐variability	prior‐award	 information	did	not	 involve	prior	
awards	 that	 were	 of	 lower	 amount	 than	 biased	 high‐variability	 prior‐
award	 information;	 rather,	 it	 had	only	 lower	 variability.	The	biased	 low‐
variability	 prior‐award	 information	 ሺranging	 from	 $50,000	 to	 $100,000ሻ	
was	 completely	 contained	within	 the	 range	 of	 values	 in	 the	 biased	 high‐
variability	 prior‐award	 information	 ሺranging	 from	 $1,000	 to	 $1	millionሻ.	
Thus,	 the	 significant	 negative	 effects	 of	 biased	 low‐variability	 relative	 to	
biased	 high‐variability	 prior‐award	 information	 provide	 particularly	
strong	evidence	 that	 low‐variability	prior‐award	 information	had	greater	









variability,	 the	 data	 provide	 strong	 evidence	 in	 the	 punitive	 damages	
scenario	 that	 low‐variability	 prior‐award	 information	 indeed	 had	 a	
significantly	 greater	 negative	 impact	 on	 spread	 than	 did	 high‐variability	
prior‐award	information.	
F.	 Effect	on	Outliers	










observations.	 This	 represents	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	 outliers	
ሺp൏0.001**ሻ.	 Furthermore,	 in	 the	 five	 unbiased	 treatment	 arms	 in	 the	
punitive	damages	scenario,	there	were	fourteen	observations	out	of	1257	
ሺ1.1%ሻ	 above	 $50	million,	 or,	 on	 average,	 approximately	 three	 ሺ14/5	 ൌ	
2.8ሻ	 above	 $50	 million	 per	 249	 observations.	 This	 also	 represents	 a	
significant	reduction	in	outliers	ሺp൏0.001***ሻ.	
In	the	control	group	of	the	dataset	for	the	pain	and	suffering	scenario,	




million	 per	 249	 observations.	 This	 represents	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	
outliers	ሺpൌ0.002**ሻ.	Furthermore,	in	the	five	unbiased	treatment	arms	in	
the	pain	 and	 suffering	 scenario,	 there	were	nineteen	observations	out	of	
1229	ሺ1.6%ሻ	above	$100	million,	or,	on	average,	approximately	four	ሺ19/5	
ൌ	 3.8ሻ	 above	 $100	million	 per	 249	 observations.	 This	 also	 represents	 a	
significant	 reduction	 in	 outliers	 ሺpൌ0.018*ሻ.	 Our	 analysis	 regarding	 the	
	
99.	 See	supra	Section	III.E.	



















0.9%	 5.2%	 0.000***	 1.3%	 4.1%	 0.002**	
Unbiased	
vs	Control	
1.1%	 5.2%	 0.000***	 1.6%	 4.1%	 0.018*	
	
	
	Figure	 10	 –	 Effect	 on	 Outliers.	 Percentage	 of	 outlier	 awards	 for	
treatment	 and	 unbiased	 conditions	 for	 punitive	 damages	 ሺleftሻ	 and	 pain	
and	suffering	ሺrightሻ.	Dotted	lines	show	percentage	of	outliers	for	control,	
and	 stars	 indicate	 statistical	 significance	 ሺafter	 correction	 for	 multiple	
comparisonsሻ	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 percentage	 of	 outliers	 between	 each	
treatment	combination	and	control.	
	
100.	 Our	 Leg	 II	 results	 confirmed	 our	 findings	 in	 Leg	 I.	 In	 Leg	 II,	 we	 observed	
significant	negative	effects	on	outliers	 for	 all	 tests	 in	 the	punitive	damages	
scenario	ሺtreatment	vs.	control,	unbiased	vs.	control,	and	biased	vs.	controlሻ.	
For	the	pain	and	suffering	scenario,	we	observed	significant	negative	effects	
on	 outliers	 caused	 by	 biased	 prior‐award	 information,	 and	 reductions—
although	 non‐significant	 reductions—in	 outliers	 associated	 with	 unbiased	
prior‐award	 information	 and	 overall	 prior‐award	 information.	 Note	 that	
these	latter	two	non‐significant	results	are	due	to	unusually	low	power	and	
do	 not	 affect	 our	 other	 results	 regarding	 the	 impact	 of	 prior‐award	
information	on	outliers.	For	example,	were	we	to	define	an	 “outlier”	as	 the	
top	 2%	 of	 awards	 ሺwhich	 would	 allow	 for	 a	 larger	 sample	 of	 “outliers”ሻ,	
these	tests	would	be	significant	as	well	ሺp൏.001***	for	treatment	vs.	control	
and	pൌ0.029*	for	unbiased	vs.	controlሻ.	
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G.	 Effect	on	Explanations	
In	 our	 exploratory	 analysis,	 we	 examined	 the	 effect	 of	 prior‐award	
information	 on	 explanation	 response	 rates.	 As	 described	 in	 Part	 III,	 we	
provided	participants	with	the	option	of	providing	an	explanation	for	the	
amount	 they	 awarded.	 In	 total,	 78.8%	 of	 participants	 who	 received	 the	
punitive	 damages	 scenario	 and	 76.2%	 of	 participants	 who	 received	 the	
pain	and	suffering	scenario	provided	explanations	for	their	awards.	
We	 found	 strong	 evidence	 that	 prior‐award	 information	 had	 a	
significant	positive	effect	on	explanation	response	rates.	Specifically,	78%	
of	 participants	 who	 received	 prior‐award	 information	 provided	
explanations,	whereas	only	72%	of	participants	who	did	not	receive	prior‐
award	 information—those	 who	 were	 assigned	 to	 control	 groups—
provided	 explanations,	 representing	 a	 significant	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	









awards	 to	 differ	 from	 juror	 awards,	 thereby	 limiting	 the	 applicability	 of	
juror	behavior	to	draw	conclusions	regarding	jury	behavior.	
Numerous	studies	have	shown	that	predeliberation	juror	preferences	
or	 certain	 aggregations	 of	 juror	 preferences	 serve	 as	 good	 predictors	 of	
jury	awards.102	Nevertheless,	 there	 is	a	 justified	concern	that	the	random	
	
101.	 In	 Leg	 II,	 prior‐award	 information	was	 associated	with	 higher	 explanation	
response	rates,	but	due	to	substantially	smaller	sample	sizes	ሺand,	 in	some	
instances,	 smaller	 increasesሻ,	 these	 effects	were	 not	 significant	 at	 the	 0.05	
level.	
102.	 See	DENNIS	 J.	 DEVINE,	 JURY	DECISION	MAKING:	 THE	 STATE	 OF	 THE	 SCIENCE	 176‐77	
ሺ2012ሻ;	Shari	Seidman	Diamond	&	Jonathan	D.	Casper,	Blindfolding	the	Jury	
to	 Verdict	 Consequences:	 Damages,	 Experts,	 and	 the	 Civil	 Jury,	 26	 LAW	 &	
SOC’Y	 REV.	 513,	 545‐46	 ሺ1992ሻ;	 see	 also	 David	 Schkade	 et	 al.,	 Deliberating	
About	Dollars:	The	Severity	Shift,	100	COLUM.	L.	REV.	1139,	1147	n.37	ሺ2000ሻ	
ሺ“We	relied	on	evidence	suggesting	that	the	median	judgment	of	a	group	of	
predeliberative	 individuals	 is	 a	 good	 predictor	 of	 the	 judgment	 that	 group	
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variation	 of	 awards	 is	 less	 for	 jury	 awards	 than	 for	 juror	 awards,	 thus	
affecting	how	and	under	what	 circumstances	 our	 results	 regarding	 juror	
behavior	extend	to	jury	behavior.103	In	spite	of	this,	due	to	the	difficulty	of	
using	 juries	 as	 experimental	 units,	 it	 is	 very	 common	 to	 use	 jurors	 and	
extrapolate	findings	to	juries.	Some	authors	have	simulated	jury	awards	in	
juror	 studies	 by	 calculating	 the	 median	 award	 in	 random	 groupings	 of	
juror	 awards.104	 We	 refrained	 from	 using	 this	 approach	 for	 various	





and	 magnitude.	 Specifically,	 we	 analyzed	 unwinsorized	 data,	 data	
winsorized	 at	 the	 99th	 percentile,	 and	 data	 winsorized	 at	 the	 90th	
percentile,	 each	 using	 various	 measures	 of	 accuracy,	 spread,	 and	
magnitude,	 to	 gain	 a	 robust	 understanding	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 interest	 on	
various	 aspects	 of	 award	 distributions—reflecting,	 for	 example,	 various	
levels	of	award	dispersion.	In	some	ways,	this	approach	has	similar	effects	
to	 the	 so‐called	 “statistical	 jury”	 approach	 but	 with	 fewer	 negative	
features.106	
Furthermore,	 aside	 from	 studies	 showing	 that	 predeliberation	 juror	
preferences	 or	 certain	 aggregations	 of	 such	 preferences	 are	 good	
predictors	of	jury	awards,	there	is	a	substantial	body	of	literature	showing	








Cognition	 and	 Valuation	 in	 Lawሻ,	 107	 YALE	 L.J.	 2071,	 2101	 ሺ1998ሻ;	 John	














a	 percentage	 of	 mean	 award	 .	.	.	 jury	 variability	 was	 lower	 than	 juror	
variability	for	both	types	of	damage	awards,”	but	dropped	only	“from	84%	
to	 78%	 for	 economic	 damages	 and	 from	 179%	 to	 146%	 for	 pain	 and	
suffering	 awards,”	 leaving	 “substantial	 unexplained	 variability	 .	.	.	 across	
juries.”108	 Similarly,	 Schkade,	 Sunstein,	 and	 Kahneman	 found	 that	
“deliberating	juries	produce	more	unpredictability	than	would	be	found	by	
taking	 the	 median	 of	 jurors’	 predeliberation	 judgments,”109	 and	 further,	
that	“27%	of	non‐zero	jury	dollar	verdicts	were	as	high	as	or	higher	than	
that	of	the	highest	predeliberation	dollar	judgment	of	individuals.”110	Their	
results	 led	 them	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	process	of	deliberation	 ሺrelative	 to	






our	 study,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 robustness	 of	 our	 findings	 to	 various	
winsorization	schemes	and	measures	of	accuracy,	spread,	and	magnitude,	
it	is	likely	that	the	effects	we	observed	in	this	study	of	juror	awards	would	
extend	 to	 jury	 awards	 as	 well.	 Nevertheless,	 “ሾcሿollective	 judgments	 are	
known	to	have	less	variability	than	individual	liability	awards,”	and	there	
is	 a	 possibility	 of	 “exaggerated	 .	.	.	 effects	 of	 anchors”;113	 in	 short,	 the	
differences	between	juror	effects	and	jury	effects	should	be	acknowledged	
and	 accounted	 for	when	 considering	 the	 implications	 of	 our	 results.	We	




109.	 Schkade	 et	 al.,	 supra	 note	 102,	 at	 1172.	 The	 authors	 also	 concluded	 that	






ሺdiscussing	 criticisms	 based	 on	 the	 disparity	 between	 juror‐based	 studies	
and	jury	awardsሻ.	
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Second,	our	study	used	mock	jurors	who	decided	an	award	following	a	
short	 summary	 describing	 one	 of	 two	 case	 scenarios	 rather	 than	 real‐
world	jurors	who	decide	an	award	following	an	actual	trial.	In	a	sense,	this	
study	 was	 a	 simplified	 “laboratory”	 experiment	 aimed	 at	 studying	 juror	
behavior.	 A	more	 ideal	 ሺalthough	 far	 costlierሻ	 experiment	would	 involve	
an	 intervention	 in	 real‐world	 jury	 trials.	 For	 example,	 the	 variability	 of	
awards	may	be	exaggerated	because	mock	 jurors	may	 treat	 the	situation	
as	hypothetical	and	 ignore	certain	real	 consequences	of	extreme	awards,	
such	 as	 bankruptcies,	 job	 loss,	 etc.114	 Note	 that	 extreme	 awards	 are	
observed	 in	 the	 real	 world,	 but	 likely	 less	 frequently	 ሺand	 perhaps	 less	
dramaticallyሻ	 than	 in	 laboratory	experiments.	Additionally,	our	summary	
descriptions	may	have	affected	 the	variability	of	awards	 ሺboth	 in	 control	
and	active	treatment	conditionsሻ	relative	to	real‐world	trials	 that	 involve	
multifaceted	 evidentiary	 support	 provided	 to	 substantiate	 arguments	 by	
the	plaintiff	and	the	defendant,	and	that	are	presided	over	by	a	judge.	
As	 above,	 however,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 our	 analyses	 using	 various	
winsorization	 schemes	 and	 various	 measures	 of	 accuracy,	 spread,	 and	
magnitude	help	 to	mitigate	 these	effects.	Again,	 our	use	of	winsorization	
and	 various	 estimands	 allowed	us	 to	 gain	 a	 robust	 understanding	 of	 the	
effects	of	interest	on	various	aspects	of	award	distributions.	Nevertheless,	









differences,	 the	MTurk	worker	 population	 is	 relatively	 representative	 of	
the	 general	 population—and	 certainly	 more	 representative	 than	
traditional	 pools	 for	 surveys	 and	 experimentation.115	 Furthermore,	 we	
	
114.	 On	the	other	hand,	it	is	possible	that	summary	descriptions	are	less	emotion‐
provoking	 than	 real‐world	 trials	 and	 therefore	 weigh	 in	 the	 opposite	
direction.	
115.	 See	 Adam	 J.	 Berinsky	 et	 al.,	 Evaluating	 Online	 Labor	 Markets	 for	
Experimental	 Research:	 Amazon.com’s	 Mechanical	 Turk,	 20	 POL.	 ANALYSIS	
351,	 366	 ሺ2012ሻ	 ሺconcluding	 that	 “relative	 to	 other	 convenience	 samples	
often	used	in	experimental	research	in	political	science,	MTurk	subjects	are	
often	 more	 representative	 of	 the	 general	 population	.	.	.	 “ሻ;	 Connor	 Huff	 &	
Dustin	 Tingley,	 “Who	 Are	 These	 People?”	 Evaluating	 the	 Demographic	






perhaps	 our	 sampleሻ	 may	 diverge	 from	 the	 general	 population	 in	 a	
number	 of	 respects,	 including	 political	 views,	 education,	 and	 age.117	
Although	we	believe	that	these	differences	are	unlikely	to	have	caused	any	
significant	 distortions,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 them	 and	 consider	
their	effects.	
	
Characteristics	 and	 Political	 Preferences	 of	 MTurk	 Survey	 Respondents,	
2015	RES.	&	POL.	1,	8	ሺ2015ሻ	ሺconcluding	that	“respondents	on	MTurk	are	not	
all	 that	 different	 from	 respondents	 on	 other	 survey	 platforms,”	 and	 that	
“there	are	strong	reasons	for	researchers	to	consider	using	MTurk	to	make	
inferences	 about	 a	 number	 of	 broader	 populations	 of	 interest”ሻ;	 Gabriele	
Paolacci	 et	 al.,	 Running	 Experiments	 on	 Amazon	 Mechanical	 Turk,	 5	
JUDGMENT	 &	 DECISION	 MAKING	 411,	 414	 ሺ2010ሻ	 ሺ“Our	 demographic	 data	
suggests	that	Mechanical	Turk	workers	are	at	least	as	representative	of	the	
U.S.	 population	 as	 traditional	 subject	 pools,	 with	 gender,	 race,	 age	 and	
education	of	Internet	samples	all	matching	the	population	more	closely	than	
college	undergraduate	 samples	and	 internet	samples	 in	general.”ሻ;	 see	also	
Roseanna	 Sommers,	 Will	 Putting	 Cameras	 on	 Police	 Reduce	 Polarization,	
125	 YALE	 L.J.	 1304,	 1331	 n.100	 ሺ2016ሻ	 ሺaddressing	 concerns	 regarding	
MTurk	 subjectsሻ.	 Berinsky	 et	 al.	 also	 conclude	 that	 MTurk	 subjects	 “are	
apparently	.	.	.	 not	 currently	 an	 excessively	 overused	 pool,	 and	 habitual	
responding	 appears	 to	 be	 a	minor	 concern,”	 but	 caution	 that	MTurk	 users	
“are	 notably	 younger	 and	 more	 ideologically	 liberal	 than	 the	 public,”	 and	
they	 “appear	 to	 pay	 more	 attention	 to	 tasks	 than	 do	 other	 respondents.”	
Berinsky	et	al.,	supra	note	115,	at	366.	
116.	 Specifically,	 we	 compared	 our	 Leg	 I	 demographic	 data	 to	 population	 data	
from	 the	 2010	 U.S.	 Census	 and	 identified	 only	 two	 significant	 differences	
between	demographic	averages	from	our	sample	and	those	from	the	Census.	
See	 generally	 American	 FactFinder,	 UNITED	 STATES	 CENSUS	 BUREAU,	
factfinder.census.gov.	In	particular,	regarding	sex,	63%	of	participants	in	our	
sample	 are	 female,	 compared	 to	 58%	 based	 on	 the	 Census	 data,	 and	
regarding	age,	2%	of	participants	in	our	sample	are	65	or	older,	compared	to	
13%	based	on	the	Census	data.	
117.	 See	 John	Campbell	 et	al.,	Time	 Is	Money:	An	Empirical	Assessment	of	Non‐
Economic	Damages	Arguments,	95	WASH.	U.	L.	REV.	1,	30	ሺ2017ሻ	ሺaddressing	
concerns	 regarding	 MTurk	 subjects	 and	 noting	 that	 subjects	 are	 “slightly	
more	liberal,	educated,	young,	and	wealthy	than	the	population	as	a	whole”ሻ.	
Note	 also	 that	 the	 jury‐eligible	 population	 may	 differ	 somewhat	 from	 the	
actual	jury	population.	
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VI.	 IMPLICATIONS	AND	CONCLUSION	
The	 “stark	 unpredictability”	 of	 awards	 for	 pain	 and	 suffering	 and	
punitive	 damages	 is	 arguably	 unacceptable.118	 We	 desire	 “predictability	
and	proportionality,”119	but,	at	the	same	time,	require	juries	to	determine	
these	 awards	 through	 nothing	 more	 than	 a	 “standardless,	 unguided	
exercise	 of	 discretion.”120	 Awards	 for	 pain	 and	 suffering	 and	 punitive	
damages	 should	be	bound	 together,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 like	 cases	 result	 in	
like	 outcomes.	 But	 courts	 have	 been	 unwilling	 to	 bind	 such	 outcomes	
together	 actively	 by	 using	 awards	 in	 comparable	 cases	 as	 guidance	 for	
award	determinations.	
Recent	literature	has	addressed,	theoretically,	the	major	objections	to	
using	 prior‐award	 information	 to	 guide	 award	 determinations,	 and	 has	
argued	 that	 prior‐award	 information	 not	 only	 reduces	 the	 variability	 of	
awards,	but	also	improves	accuracy,	reflecting	both	bias	and	variance.	The	
instant	 study	 makes	 a	 number	 of	 important	 contributions.	 First,	 it	
confirms	 empirically	 the	 hypotheses	 that	 prior‐award	 information	
ሺwhether	 biased	 or	 unbiasedሻ	 substantially	 reduces	 the	 dispersion	 of	
awards	and	that	biased	prior‐award	information	causes	a	distortion	in	the	
size	of	awards	in	the	direction	of	the	bias.	These	results	hold	regardless	of	
whether	 prior‐award	 information	 is	 provided	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 average,	
range,	or	 list	of	prior	awards.	Additionally,	 the	study	suggests	a	potential	
for	 distortion	 of	 award	 size	 from	 unbiased	 prior‐award	 information.	
Defining	 award	 size	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 median—the	 most	 common	 measure	
used	in	previous	literature—we	observed	no	significant	distortion	caused	
by	 unbiased	 prior‐award	 information.	 But	we	 observed	 such	 distortions	
using	other	measures.	The	effect	of	unbiased	prior‐award	information	on	
award	size	is	a	question	for	future	research.	
Most	 importantly,	 our	 study	 shows	 that	 prior‐award	 information	
causes	substantial	improvements	in	the	accuracy	of	awards,	and	that	such	
improvements	 are	 robust	 to	 changes	 in	 scenario,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 bias,	
variability,	and	form	of	prior	awards.	This	means	that	any	introduction	of	
error	 caused	 by	 distorting	 award	 size	 is	 dominated	 by	 the	 beneficial	
effects	 of	 prior‐award	 information	 on	 the	 dispersion	 of	 awards.	
Furthermore,	these	effects	hold	under	various	definitions	of	accuracy	and	
various	winsorization	 schemes	 ሺsimulating,	 for	 example,	mechanisms	 by	
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strong	 evidence	 that	prior‐award	 information	has	 the	beneficial	 effect	 of	
reducing	the	rate	of	outlier	awards.	
These	 findings	 provide	 strong	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 proposals	 to	
provide	jurors	with	prior‐award	information	as	guidance	for	determining	
awards	 for	 pain	 and	 suffering	 and	 punitive	 damages.	 Specifically,	 they	
provide	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	 behavioral	 assumptions	 underlying	
such	 proposals,	 and	 for	 the	 proposition	 that	 prior‐award	 information	
would	improve	accuracy,	even	under	a	wide	range	of	bias,	variability,	and	
form	 conditions.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Part	 II,	 the	 primary	 objection	 to	 prior‐
award	 information	 is	 that	 its	benefits	 rely	on	 the	actual	 comparability	of	
the	prior	cases	to	the	subject	case.	But	the	instant	study	shows	that	this	is	
not	 so:	 prior‐award	 information	 improves	 accuracy	 even	when	 the	prior	
cases	 are	 not	 comparable	 to	 the	 subject	 case	 and	 even	when	 they	 entail	
wide‐ranging	 facts	 and	wide‐ranging	 awards,	 or,	 for	 that	matter,	 narrow	
facts	and	narrow	awards,	and	regardless	of	whether	the	prior	awards	are	




of	 this	 article.	We	note,	 however,	 that	 although	 there	 is	 good	 reason	 to	 be	
highly	 resistant	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 bias—such	 as	 bias	 based	 on	 race	 or	
gender—such	resistance	should	arguably	not	apply	 to	distortions	of	award	





the	 award	 is	 unbiasedሻ,	 but	 that	 it	 is	 highly	 variable	 around	 its	 correct	
award,	 having	 a	 plausible	 range	 of	 $0	 to	 $10	 million.	 A	 procedure	 or	
evidentiary	rule	that	reduces	the	plausible	range	of	the	award	to	$5	million	
to	 $6	 million	 may	 be	 much	 preferred	 over	 the	 status	 quo,	 even	 if	 such	 a	
procedure	 or	 rule	 causes	 some	 bias,	 for	 example,	 a	 new	 average	 award	 of	
$5.5	million.	Furthermore,	prior‐award	information	may	in	fact	reduce	race‐
based	 and	 gender‐based	 bias,	 and	 other	 sources	 of	 bias	 to	 which	 courts	
should	be	highly	resistant,	by	increasing	the	relative	influence	of	factors	that	




contrary	 to	 current	 values,	 and	 it	 may	 in	 fact	 advance	 them.	 Claim	
dependence	facilitates	the	goal	that	like	cases	receive	like	outcomes,	and	that	
“more	 extreme”	 claims	 receive	 “more	 extreme”	 awards,	 etc.	 It	 is	 also	
noteworthy	that,	 in	many	contexts,	courts	do	indeed	allow	the	outcomes	of	
claims	to	be	influenced	by	the	outcomes	of	other	claims,	notwithstanding	the	
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Some	 level	 of	 bias—for	 example,	 bias	 resulting	 from	 extreme	 non‐
comparability—would	 cause	 a	 reduction	 in	 accuracy.	 But	 the	 effects	 we	
observed	occurred	under	relatively	extreme	levels	of	bias	and	variability,	
and	 under	 a	 range	 of	 winsorization	 schemes	 and	measures	 of	 accuracy.	
Given	a	 reasonable	method	of	 selecting	prior	 cases	and	providing	award	
information	to	jurors,	prior‐award	information	is	highly	likely	to	improve	
the	accuracy	of	awards	for	pain	and	suffering	and	punitive	damages.	
Furthermore,	 our	 results	 may	 have	 implications	 for	 alternative	
methods	 of	 controlling	 award	 unpredictability,	 such	 as	 damage	 caps.	 As	
highlighted	 in	 Part	 II,	 instituting	 damage	 caps	 is	 a	 highly	 controversial	
method	 of	 controlling	 unpredictability	 that	 caps	 damage	 awards,	 or	
certain	 types	 of	 damage	 awards,	without	 consideration	 of	 the	 particular	
facts	 of	 a	 case.	 Notwithstanding	 frequent	 criticism	 on	 fairness	 and	
constitutional	 grounds,	 and	 the	 transfer	 of	 discretion	 away	 from	 jurors,	
damage	caps	remain	a	primary	method	of	 controlling	unpredictability.122	
Our	results	provide	support	for	the	argument	that	crude	and	drastic	cap‐




Finally,	 although	our	 finding	 that	prior‐award	 information	 caused	an	
increased	 likelihood	 that	 participants	 would	 provide	 an	 explanation	 for	
their	 awards	 is	 subject	 to	 interpretation,	 one	plausible	possibility	 is	 that	
prior‐award	 information	 provides	 context	 for	 an	 award,	 allowing	 for	 a	
more	 thoughtful	 or	 analytical	 award	 determination.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	
prior‐award	 information	 provides	 jurors	 with	 a	 framework	 in	 which	 to	









and	 other	 civil	 contexts,	 and	 “proportionality	 review”	 and	 other	 forms	 of	
sentence	comparisons	in	the	criminal	context.	
122.	 See	supra	Section	II.A.	
123.	 Our	 results	 may	 have	 implications	 for	 other	 legal	 contexts	 as	 well—for	
example,	criminal	sentencing.	
124.	 Jutzi‐Johnson,	263	F.3d	at	759.	
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of	 awards	 for	pain	 and	 suffering	 and	punitive	damages	while	preserving	
the	 discretion	 of	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 and	 improving	 the	 accuracy	 of	 awards	
generally.	
	
